EAST-WEST CHURCH & MINISTRY REPORT
WINTER 2017 Vol. 25, No. 1

Religious Politics in Crimea, 2014 - 2016

Roman Lunkin

The Crimean Peninsula became a testing ground of religious politics after joining Russia in 2014. Religious organizations faced challenges they never could have imagined previously. The international community has shown little interest in the fate of persecuted Christians in Crimea. Their churches became outcasts in the eyes of the rest of the world. At the same time the political problems faced by Crimean churches have become a subject of discussion in Ukraine.

In 2014-2016 Crimea became subject to Russian religious legislation on freedom of conscience and religious politics as interpreted by local authorities and law enforcement agencies. The new order consisted of copying Russian federal support for Orthodox churches of the Moscow Patriarchate, manipulation of Islam and its leaders, and restrictions on most Protestant church development. Security measures have included the deportation of certain Evangelical and Muslim leaders, church searches, and the liquidation of religious groups already banned in Russia, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

Crimea's "transition" to Russia, the term locals use when speaking of their joining Russia in 2014, has been the peninsula's third major trial in the past 100 years. First, the Crimean population endured the dreadful shock of the Red Terror of the Bolsheviks in 1917-1921. Second, they endured the devastation of the Second World War, including Stalin's deportation of Soviet citizens of German and Italian origin in 1941-42, the German conquest and occupation, the Red Army expulsion of German forces, and Stalin's subsequent 1944 deportation of Tatars, Armenians, Bulgarians, and Greeks, which drastically changed the ethnic composition of Crimea. And third, Russia's move into Crimea in 2014 proved to be a shock for a number of reasons. Thousands of Ukrainians and Tatars emigrated, including many Christian believers who moved to Ukraine proper or other countries. (Estimates range from 20,000 to 100,000 people.)

Every church and religious association has been searching for its own way of survival under new political circumstances. Many church leaders feel they have been left alone to face the authorities. Ties between Crimean and Ukrainian believers have been broken as the latter have accused those who have remained in Crimea of "collaborating" with Russian "occupation authorities." Each church is living in isolation, looking for its own way to accommodate new "Russian patriotic" norms, trying not to become at the same time an enemy in the eyes of Ukrainian, European, and American fellow believers.

Orthodoxy and State Politics

The new order in Crimea did not mean loss and persecution for everyone. As often happens during a power shift, some institutions and individuals even strengthen their position. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) enhanced its influence in Crimea after 2014. Moreover, it became the main ideological basis for and the symbol of Russia's presence in Crimea. Fundamentally the Moscow Patriarchate stresses the inviolability of its canonical borders and non-interference in its internal affairs.

The UOC MP is divided into three independent dioceses in Crimea: Simferopol, Dzhankoi, and Feodosia. Even though Crimea has three bishops, the leading role, in fact, belongs to Metropolitan Lazarus, head of the Simferopol and Crimean Diocese. Situated in the center of the peninsula, this diocese is home to Crimea's wealthiest parishes and monasteries. It should be mentioned that prior to 2014, Metropolitan Lazarus was not the defender of Russian culture and did not support Crimea joining Russia, but rather attempted to navigate a more-or-less neutral position. Russian activists even considered him to be pro-Ukrainian, especially compared to the well-known supporter of Russia and enemy of Ukrainian independence, Metropolitan Agafangel of Odessa. Crimean Cossacks were also unhappy with Metropolitan Lazarus, accusing him of pro-Ukrainian sentiments and an absence of support for Russian patriots. Mass media also accused Metropolitan Lazarus of insufficient opposition to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP), which Ukrainian authorities were attempting to support. However, once Russia gained control of Crimea, the bishops of the three UOC MP dioceses, and Metropolitan Lazarus especially, instantly and with no reservations began collaborating with Russian authorities.

Russia's President, Vladimir Putin, personally supported the completion of the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Simferopol. Since 2014 Crimea's UOC MP dioceses have become an active part of the region's educational, cultural, and social programs. Russian federal programs and new donors from Russia have also provided substantial support for

(continued on page 2)

UOC MP monasteries as part of the program to encourage tourism and spiritual pilgrimage to Crimea.

UOC MP laity and clergy have been active in helping refugees from Ukraine. Some of those who have fled from the Donbas Region have temporarily moved to Crimea, while others have chosen to live in Crimea permanently. Even before 2014, the Sevastopol Deanery of the Simferopol Diocese of the UOC MP exuded Russian patriotism and fortified its links with the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

Orthodox jurisdictions other than the UOC MP have not fared well in the wake of Russian annexation of Crimea. The Ukrainian Orthodox Autonomous Church (UOAC), which did not have a strong presence in Crimea prior to 2014, has virtually disappeared, and its clergy and activists have departed for Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate in the person of Archbishop Kliment, head of the UOC KP Crimean Diocese, continues to struggle to hold on in Crimea. Russian authorities and police in Crimea are in the process of gradually transferring UOC KP churches to UOC MP jurisdiction, even without the direct involvement of the UOC MP itself. As Archbishop Kliment notes, only nine out of 15 parishes of the UOC KP continue to function in Crimea, and most priests have departed. UOC KP churches in Krasnokopsk, Kerch, Sevastopol, Perevalny, and Saki no longer function.

Even though UOC KP Patriarch Filaret has been most aggressive in his rhetoric towards Putin and the Kremlin, Russia hesitates to liquidate the UOC KP in Crimea because it would instantly put the UOC MP in harm's way in Ukraine.

The greatest challenge faced by the UOC KP in Crimea is the possibility of the loss of its Prince Vladimir and Princess Olga Cathedral in Simferopol. In Soviet times this building was turned into an officers' club, but after 1991 Ukrainian authorities gave the property to the UOC KP for perpetual lease. After 2014 local authorities increased the previously nominal charge for lease on the building and rented parts of the premises to other tenants. On 14 June 2016 the Sevastopol Court of Appeal ordered the Crimean Diocese of the UOC KP to vacate the premises of the Cathedral (112 square meters) and pay a 500,000 ruble fine to the Ministry of Property and Land Relations of Crimea. The Kyiv Patriarchate has appealed the ruling.

Since Crimea joined Russia, Archbishop Kliment has become a well-known media figure. He regularly speaks via publications that oppose Russia, gives interviews to Ukraine's Radio Svoboda and the website Crimea.Reality (ru.krymr.com) and travels to Ukraine, sharing that believers in Crimea are persecuted. Even though Archbishop Kliment has been critical of Russian policy, local Crimean authorities have not taken measures of repression against him that might be expected. Nor did Russian authorities immediately abolish the UOC KP in Crimea in 2014. The fact is, even though UOC KP Patriarch Filaret has been most aggressive in his rhetoric towards Putin and the Kremlin, Russia hesitates to liquidate the UOC KP in Crimea because it would instantly put the UOC MP in harm's way in Ukraine. The UOC MP in Ukraine is under constant suspicion for having its center in Moscow, capital of the "aggressor" nation. Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill in Moscow, together with the UOC MP under Metropolitan Onufry in Kyiv, try their best to stay neutral and pacify those of their Ukrainian bishops who might consider breaking with Moscow. Still, a high level of confrontation in Crimea may yet lead to the UOC KP losing its cathedral in Simferopol and the closure of all its remaining churches in the peninsula.

Eastern-Rite and Roman Catholics

After the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, Russia considered Roman Catholics, the UOC KP, Eastern-Rite Greek Catholics, and Protestants to be westernized and unreliable confessions. But Moscow since 2014 unexpectedly has intervened to help the Catholic Church secure its legality in Crimea, progress it would never have gained had the territory not become Russian. Curiously, Moscow has even allowed the formation of a new Catholic diocese in Crimea, in addition to four other dioceses in Russia, but formally the new structure is called a pastoral district.

Bishop Yatsek Pyl of Odessa and Simferopol was appointed on 22 December 2014 to head the new pastoral district. Its formation became possible after negotiations between the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Vatican. In the end Moscow sent a direct order to Crimean authorities to register Catholic parishes as autonomous organizations which, de facto, constituted the pastoral district. This district unites not only Roman Catholic communities, but surprisingly also Eastern-Rite Greek Catholics who are registered as Catholics of the Byzantine Rite. (They have 12 parishes and three churches in Crimea in Evpatoria, Yalta, and Kerch.) Ukrainian Greek Catholics in Crimea made a wise choice in uniting with the Roman Catholic pastoral district because they were in danger of suppression by Russian authorities in 2014. (Greek Catholics took an active part in Maidan demonstrations, and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Archbishop Svyatoslav was also a fervent critic of Russia as the "aggressor" in Crimea.) One incident could have—but did not—lead to Greek Catholic banishment from Crimea. During the most difficult period in March 2014, pro-Russian forces found 10 bulletproof vests in Ukrainian Greek Catholic Father Nikolay Kvych's residence in Sevastopol, at which point he fled Crimea. Father Bogdan Kostetski now serves as dean of Ukrainian Greek Catholic parishes in Crimea.

As for Roman Catholicism, after World War II none of its churches existed in Simferopol, and its previously secularized sanctuary was demolished in 1974. The community revived in 1993, but only in 1997 did Simferopol Catholics obtain a small private house for their worship needs on the outskirts of the city: the Chapel of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. In the past 10 years this parish has experienced significant growth. Some 300 people

attend Mass in three Sunday services in order to accommodate all worshippers. In addition, a special Mass is held for medical students from Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and India. In all, Simferopol is home to approximately 1,000 baptized Catholics of Ukrainian, German, Polish, and Czech nationalities.

At the same time, attempts to obtain land for church construction from the mayor's office in Simferopol have not succeeded. On 24 March 2014 Father Daniel Maslentsev picketed in protest by himself in front of the city administration building, an act condemned by representatives of the mayor. In December 2015, as Father Daniel explained to the author, when a delegation from the European Parliament and European journalists came to Crimea, local officials gave their relations with the Catholic community as an example of religious tolerance. Father Daniel was promised a meeting with Mayor Gennady Bacharey to discuss building site options for a Roman Catholic Church, but after the European delegation left, no meeting with the mayor was forthcoming. Simferopol officials, Father Daniel related, "never do anything unless they are told from above or they anticipate profit for themselves."

Despite all the difficulties faced by Roman Catholics, Father Daniel Maslentsev nevertheless believes "much more religious tolerance exists in Crimea than in Russia proper." Presumably the centralized structure that the Roman Catholic Church possesses in the Vatican has allowed its congregants in Crimea to more ably put forward their claims to authorities than has been the case with the peninsula's smaller, decentralized religious communities. ♦

Editor's Note: The concluding portion of this article will be published in the next issue of the East West Church and Ministry Report.

Roman Lunkin *is Director of the Center for Religious Studies of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia.*

Religious Associations in Crimea (29 July 2016)

Orthodox		
Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate	370	
Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kyiv Patriarchate	9*	
Old Believers	4	
Orthodox Subtotal		**383**
Roman Catholic		9
Catholics of the Byzantine Rite		12*
Armenian Apostolic		6
Protestant		
Evangeliocal Lutheran	10	
Evangelical Reformed	1	
United Methodist	2	
Evangelical Christian -Baptist	57	
Evangelical Christian	8	
Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostal)	62	
Salvation Army	2	
Presbyterian	2	
Christian	2	
New Apostolic	2	
Messianic	3	
Seventh-day Adventist	2	
Evangelical Christian Missionary	3	
Protestant Subtotal		**156**
Muslim		144
Jewish		10
Jehovah's Witness		22
Mormons		3
Krishnaites		2
Karaites		2
Total		**749**

Source: Information portal of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian non-profit minjust.ru.
*Figures from the research of Roman Lunkin.

The Slavic Bible Commentary

Peter Penner

On 1 October 2016 in Kyiv, Ukraine, the Euro-Asiatic Accrediting Association of Evangelical Instructional Institutions celebrated the completion of its *Slavianskii bibleiskii kommentarii [Slavic Bible Commentary]*, under the general editorship of sociologist and theologian Sergei V. Sannikov. Published in Ukraine (6,000 copies) and Russia (3,000 copies, with the assistance of the Bible League), this 1,840-page commentary has a price of $50 in the West and $39.99 in the former Soviet Union.

Origins of the Project

Designed to provide a "contemporary Evangelical perspective" on the Bible, it was undertaken as an indigenous response to the well-known Russian translation of William Barclay's *Daily Study Bible Series,* completed in 1985 (for the New Testament) and 1994 (for the Old Testament). In 2011, missionary educator Mary Raber reminded everyone of the success story of this commentary, but also included some of the questions that have been raised as the *Russian Barclay Commentary* has been read in a Slavic context ("Remembering the *Russian Bible Commentary*, A Memoir in Context" in *History and Mission in Europe: Continuing the Conversation* [*Schwarzenfeld, Germany: Neufeld Verlag, 2011*], *edited by Mary Raber and Peter Penner,* a festschrift in honor of Walter Sawatsky).

At the end of her article Raber (p. 325) announced the launching of the *Slavic Bible Commentary* project, but also highlighted a widely circulated question concerning it. Did Russian-speaking lands possess enough Bible teachers and scholars capable of writing a Bible commentary in and for the Eurasian context? At that time former Evangelical Christian-Baptist leader Alexei M. Bychkov clearly did not think so, while evangelical scholar Sergei V. Sannikov sounded more optimistic: "I can think of 15 [potential contributors] easily" (Raber, p. 325). In 2010, when Sannikov agreed to serve as general editor for this challenging project, he believed he would be able to recruit many competent Bible scholars. But would there be enough evangelical authors to actually write a solid commentary on every book of the Bible in Russian? Various reservations notwithstanding, over a span of six years of hard work, the project attracted 94 different contributors from various evangelical denominations from all over the former Soviet Union and a few from the Russian-speaking diaspora in Europe and North America.

The project attracted 94 different contributors from various evangelical denominations from all over the former Soviet Union and a few from the Russian-speaking diaspora in Europe and North America.

Demographics

By nationality the editorial board consists of seven Ukrainians, two Russians, and one Russian-German. By denomination, the editorial board includes five Evangelical Christians-Baptists, three Pentecostals, and one each from Missionary Alliance and Mennonite Brethren churches.

By present country of origin (apart from the editorial board) authors include 35 from Ukraine, 29 from Russia, eight from the United States (immigrants from the former Soviet Union), three from Germany, two each from Belarus and Moldova, and one each from Kyrgyzstan, the Czech Republic, Austria, Australia, and Israel. By denomination authors include 39 Evangelical Christians-Baptists, 20 Pentecostals, 11 Evangelical Christians, six Christian Missionary Union, two Mennonite, and one each from Brethren, Anglican, Christian, New Life Charismatic, non-denominational, and Messianic Jewish churches. By gender authors include 72 men and 12 women.

The Editorial Team

The driving force behind the project has been its editorial team, including Old Testament editors Valery Alikin, Gennady Pshenichny, Alexander Geychenko, and Roman Soloviy; New Testament editor Peter Penner; and Fyodor Raychynets as editor for topical articles. Mikhaylo Mokienko served as coordinator of the commentary project, collecting and circulating various article drafts between authors and editors. Taras Dyatlik oversaw public relations activities and maintained close communications with Langham Partners (Peter Kwant), which provided funding and valuable advice. Yevgeny Ustinovich joined the editorial team halfway through the process when the project needed a competent literary editor. General Editor Sergei V. Sannikov was the soul of the editorial team from its beginning.

Before the process of writing began, the editors hammered out various guidelines and parameters for the commentary. It was the team's meeting in Jerusalem in February 2012 that was instrumental in laying the foundations and setting the direction. After a long discussion, those assembled agreed to designate the commentary *Slavic*. Obviously, no group of authors could fully represent all of Europe's Slavic populations. In addition, with each East European nation striving to consolidate its independent existence, it was decided not to designate the work as a *Russian* Bible commentary, as a number of contributors would not be Russian. Nevertheless, the Russian language was chosen because it is still used by many Eurasian Christian communities as a *lingua franca*, even beyond Russia and the former Soviet Union.

Contextual and Hermeneutical Guidelines

Internationally the commentary is not unique in its focus on contextualization, but follows the pattern set, for example, by the *African Bible Commentary* and the *Asian Bible Commentary.* A contextual commentary only draws upon sources and scholarship produced and accessible in the East European context. In addition, it is guided in its interpretations by questions engendered by its geographic setting and the particularities of an East European mentality, spirituality, piety, and church history. In contrast to the Russian-language *William*

Barclay's Daily Study Bible Series, which is a product of Western biblical scholarship, and Thomas Oden's church fathers' commentaries on the Bible, the *Slavic Bible Commentary* strives for relevance in its East European context. Its goal is to complement, not replace, earlier commentaries. It is an attempt to give the church another relevant commentary of the whole Bible, offering help primarily to Slavic preachers and teachers.

Editors of the *Slavic Bible Commentary* spelled out hermeneutical as well as contextual guidelines for its individual authors. One editorial decision was to avoid lengthy discussions of authorship, date, place of writing, and audience for Bible texts. Instead, the focus was to be on the final biblical texts as they were included in the canon and examinations of their place in the canon. Authors were instructed to interpret the Bible not verse by verse, but by paragraphs, identifying key arguments, words, and phrases, explaining main theological issues, and offering suggestions for life applications of Bible passages. Such an approach was accepted in order to assist readers in better understanding a given biblical text for the benefit of teaching small groups, working with other groups in the church, and sermon preparation.

Inter-Denominational Cooperation

The final editorial meeting took place in October 2015 in Kyiv, the city of origin for Eastern Slavic Christianity. The first (Jerusalem) and final (Kyiv) meeting locations underscore the significance of the Eastern context. As with any collection of contributions by different authors, the work of some authors will be appreciated more than others. Nevertheless, this one-volume commentary of approximately two million words, authored by more than 80 Russian-language contributors, provides concrete proof that evangelicals in Eurasia are able to work together in unity. Six years of tensions and difficulties notwithstanding, the *Slavic Bible Commentary* has come to fruition as a monument to the unity of God's church. It also calls readers to overcome divisions of politics, ethnicity, and denominational affiliation in order to focus on believers' oneness in Christ, worshiping the Trinity and continuing to be God's sent people. ♦

Peter Penner, *Bielefeld, Germany, is Director of Advanced Studies of the Euro-Asiatic Accrediting Association.*

The Slavic Bible Commentary calls readers to overcome divisions of politics, ethnicity, and denominational affiliation in order to focus on believers' oneness in Christ.

A Merging of Protestant and Orthodox Theology and Practice: Evangelical Christian Baptists of Georgia

Malkhaz Songulashvili

Editor's note: The first two parts of this article were published in the two previous issues of the East-West Church and Ministry Report 24 *(Summer 2016):1-4 and (Fall 2016): 11-14.*

Religious Nationalism and the Perceived Threat of "Foreign Sects"

In Georgia there were no Western religious supermarkets available where people could freely choose their religion. In Georgia, rather, the space once occupied by Soviet ideology was replaced with religious nationalism. Unfortunately, in the 1990s, the religio-political situation did not offer the opportunity for religious liberty in Georgia, which could possibly have stimulated renewal and reforms in the Georgian Orthodox Church, as a custodian of Georgian culture.

On 5 April 1995, at the synod of the Georgian Orthodox Church chaired by the catholicos patriarch, discussion of proselytizing groups was summarized in the meeting's minutes as follows:

> Some representatives of foreign ideologies and religious sects take advantage of the difficult situation in our country and hide themselves behind the mask of democracy. They coarsely interfere in the spiritual life of our population and by this they inflict great damage on our people. Some humanitarian [organizations], while giving out humanitarian aid, proselytize, that is recruit the faithful into foreign faiths…. Because of such influences there are a lot of family conflicts and splits. There are cases where couples are divorced and some murders have also taken place.[1]

This statement refers again to the Russian experience of the influx of the parachurch organizations, mainly from North America, who were involved in proselytizing Russian Orthodox. The only humanitarian groups that were involved in relief work in Georgia were the Salvation Army and Caritas, a Roman Catholic humanitarian organization. The ECB was involved in humanitarian aid activity with the help of the Baptist World Alliance. But none of the aid received by the ECB was used for any kind of proselytizing activity. During the war in Abkhazia, medicines were delivered by a large American aircraft, which the ECB distributed to state-owned hospitals. The statement about large-scale social conflicts leading even to murder is simply a fantasy.

Five months later, on 18-19 September 1995, the Expanded Church Council of the Georgian Orthodox Church maintained, "The danger from the invasion by various sects is real, not only for the church but for the state as well. Their activity should be controlled by law." The call to use the law to control "foreign religious sects" was not an original idea produced by the Georgian Patriarchate, and these "foreign sects" in Georgia were in reality respected churches (Roman Catholics, Baptists) that did not come to the country with the opening up of the borders after the breakup of the Soviet Union, but were churches that had endured the oppression and persecution of the Communist regime along with the Orthodox. The idea was to use state law to gain religious hegemony. However, instead of introducing negative, restrictive legislation for non-Orthodox, the government signed the Constitutional

(continued on page 6)

In Georgia there were no Western religious supermarkets available where people could freely choose their religion. In Georgia, rather, the space once occupied by Soviet ideology was replaced with religious nationalism.

Agreement with the church in 2001, which positively granted status in law to the Orthodox Church with numerous privileges, but which also gave recognition to Catholics, Baptists, and other "traditional" faiths.[2]

Nevertheless, competition from non-Orthodox churches provoked the Orthodox Church into doing what it should have been doing all along, confirming one of scholar Rodney Stark's key points regarding religious competition overcoming the laziness of monopoly churches.[3] The Orthodox Expanded Council stated that "the missionary activity of the Church should be extended, which first and foremost should be expressed in establishing parish schools in every parish." At the council "it was pointed out that it is necessary for the clergy to develop closer relations with the people, especially now, when the strengthening of foreign religions has been felt."[4]

The campaign against non-Orthodox Christian churches and other religious groups, starting with the 1994 Christmas Epistle and continuing throughout the decade, posed a serious challenge to ECB ministry in Georgia. The question of the legitimacy of the ministry of the ECB was at stake. It had to prove that its mandate to evangelize was valid and that its evangelistic activity could not be identified as proselytism.

By signing the Common Declaration of Proselytism in 2001 with the ECB, the Orthodox recognized the right of the ECB to preach the Gospel in Georgia under the mandate of religious human rights.

The Question of Territoriality

Despite its ecclesial independence from Russia, the Georgian Orthodox Church has been heavily influenced by the Moscow Patriarchate, and therefore its arguments against non-Orthodox evangelism in the country have been heavily influenced by Muscovite reasoning. In the early 1990s the Moscow Patriarchate complained that after the breakup of the Soviet Union many Christians came to Russia, not to aid the Russian Orthodox Church, but to compete with it for its own souls on its own territory. Moscow Patriarch Alexii II quoted in this connection the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans: "It is my ambition to bring the gospel to places where the very name of Christ has not been heard, for I do not want to build on another man's foundation" (Romans 15: 20). The Moscow Patriarchate "welcomes friendly visits…of other denominations from other countries, but opposes their proselytizing of Russian Christians.[5] The catholicos patriarch of Georgia applied the same argument to the ministry of the ECB of Georgia.[6] But the argument did not work well in the Georgian context because the Georgian ECB did not come from abroad to evangelize the people of Georgia.

The ECB went back to Jesus, who recognized that the work of the kingdom of God did not have to be solely centered on the special group of the disciples but could be practiced by others in parallel with the work of the chosen twelve. In arguing such a position, the ECB appealed to what Jesus said that suggested that the territorial claims of the Orthodox Church did not reflect the wider legitimization of Christian mission to be found in the New Testament: "John answered, 'Master, we saw someone casting out demons in your name, and we tried to stop him, because he is not one of us.' But Jesus said to him, 'Do not stop him for whoever is not against you is for you'" (Luke 9:45-50). For the ECB, this text has been considered Jesus' affirmation of religious diversity.[7] But for the Orthodox, the argument from the patristic period was far more important. The principle of canonical territory with ecclesial jurisdiction is based on the canons of the First Ecumenical Council (325).[8] Other ecumenical and local councils from the fourth to the eighth centuries also accepted decrees in support of canonical territories.

By signing the Common Declaration of Proselytism in 2001 with the ECB, the Orthodox recognized the right of the ECB to preach the Gospel in Georgia under the mandate of religious human rights. This could be considered as a code of conduct between the majority and minority churches in the Georgian context. The Common Declaration clearly stated, "For a church, a denial of preaching equals denying its existence. The prohibition of preaching would also be a violation of universally recognized human rights."[9]

The Patronage of the Theotokos

With the opening of borders after the breakup of the Soviet Union, another argument against proselytizing assumed prominence. According to this argument, Georgia is a country allotted to the Theotokos, the Mother of God. The concept of Mary's patronage of Georgia developed over the course of centuries, gradually becoming more prominent, especially in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After the rise of religious nationalism, the patronage of the Theotokos was adopted by politicians as a historical fact. Even President Shevardnadze referred to Mary's patronage in his speech made at the Baptist Cathedral in 2003. It is still being repeated by representatives from a wide spectrum of political life in Georgia.

In the 1990s, before the Georgian Orthodox Church and Evangelical Baptist Church of Georgia signed their Common Declaration, and before the dramatic changes in liturgical practices of the ECB, it was maintained that any non-Orthodox Christian Churches should not have a right to evangelize in Georgia because of the special patronage of Mary the Theotokos. The ECB was particularly targeted by ultraconservative groups in the country because of their anti-Marian reputation from the Soviet era. The reforms in the ECB community, however, restored the balance in relation to the place of Mary in its spirituality. It never affirmed the patronage of the Theotokos, but it has given her a more prominent place in its spirituality. For instance, icons of the incarnation, Mary, and the baby Jesus are prominently placed in Georgian Baptist sanctuaries, and chants to the Theotokos are sung in the liturgy. By restoring due respect and veneration to Mary, the Georgian ECB, denominationally, has gone further than any Baptist union or convention anywhere in the world.[10]

The Orthodox Liturgy and the Cult of Antiquity

For Orthodox, the Divine Liturgy is the most important means for mission and evangelism. Father Ion Bria, a Romanian Orthodox theologian, wrote extensively of the significance of the liturgy for evangelism.[11] The liturgy in Orthodox missiology was also studied by an evangelical scholar, James J.

Stamoolis, who wrote, "It is no exaggeration to state that the chief feature of the Orthodox Church is its liturgical orientation."

Obviously, the Georgian Orthodox Church fully practices the liturgical legacy of Orthodoxy. But to make the best use of the liturgical tradition, it is necessary to celebrate it in language the people understand, not ancient Georgian. Orthodox even recite biblical readings in ancient Georgian, even though a modern Georgian Bible text is available. The official stand of the Georgian Orthodox Church is that the church never changes, preserving immaculately every single tradition of early Christianity, which it judges makes it the only authentic church in the nation.[12] In accordance with this tradition, all theological views and liturgical practices have, it affirms, been unchangeably preserved by the Orthodox Church. Thus, in the present climate in the Orthodox Church, it is not possible to think of translating and using the liturgy in the modern Georgian language. This particular stance in its present form has also been inherited from the Russian Orthodox tradition. A progressive-minded Russian Orthodox priest and professor at the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, Fr. Vladimir Fedorov, points out that "one widespread and quite deeply rooted idea is that Orthodoxy is the church where everything has been preserved since apostolic times and will not tolerate change." Bravely, he maintains that this false stereotype is "non-historical."[13] Fr. Alexander Schmemann of St. Vladimir's Orthodox Seminary in New York also wrote of the "cult of antiquity" as being a part of "Romantic Orthodoxy" which "pushes reality away for the sake of an imagined reality; it is belief in illusions."[14]

In reality, the Orthodox Church has experienced dramatic changes in history, including changes in theology, doctrine, and liturgical practices. It is infantile to deny change, but, for some reason or another, the antiquity and unchangeability of the tradition has become a dominant theme that deprives the Orthodox Church both of flexibility and the opportunity to share the experiences of other churches in a changing world.

Fascinating research has been carried out in the study of Orthodox liturgy by Robert F. Taft, S.J., a professor at Rome's Pontifical Oriental Institute. In his five-volume history of the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, the eucharistic liturgy most frequently used in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, Taft reveals various historical layers of the liturgical text that reflect the theological and historical context of its centuries-long development.[15]

The Georgian Orthodox Church needs to be critical of the "cult of the past" to enable it to rediscover the evangelistic energy in its own liturgy. Such a discovery could also serve as an important step in cooperating with the ECB in the cause of evangelism. For the time being, the claim to antiquity and authenticity by the Orthodox serves as a criticism of the liturgy of other Christian churches.

Counter-culturalism

Robert Taft has rightly suggested that "cultural rejection as well as adaptation has always been integral to the process of inculturation. The church does not just borrow and adapt from local cultures: it also resolutely rejects aspects, even fundamental religious aspects, of those cultures."[16] Culture not only ought to be affirmed, but should be critiqued as well. The Venerable Bede gives a classic example of the reinterpretation of pre-Christian religious culture in Britain.[17] The temple is "baptized" and accepted for mission, but idols are rejected.

The ECB has affirmed Georgian culture by letting it shape its mission. But this does not mean that it indiscriminately accepts everything that belongs to that culture. Specifically, the ECB has rejected Georgian religious nationalism and political Orthodoxy. The first written evidence of this rejection was recorded in the concluding document of the Orthodox-Baptist dialogue. For their part, Orthodox considered the ECB stance separating faith from the nation to be a "denuding" of religion; Orthodox would not even fully accept the understanding that "Christians of all countries are brothers and sisters." In contrast, the ECB believes that religious nationalism and ethnocentrism are so deeply entrenched in Georgia's culture and are so inimical to the Gospel that it has refused to condone them. While it encourages patriotism that represents a love of people and culture, it rejects a nationalism that alienates people one from another. Such counter-culturalism is justifiable in the light of the mission of God, which implies the friendship and equality of all races and cultures.

The ECB believes that religious nationalism and ethnocentrism are so deeply entrenched in Georgia's culture and are so inimical to the Gospel that it has refused to condone them. It rejects a nationalism that alienates people one from another.

Conclusion

First, this study started with the intention of discovering what happens when two dramatically different religio-cultural traditions come together: the tradition of the European Radical Reformation and the tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy. In the past several decades they have merged in the ECB, which has incorporated the best of both traditions. In the Georgian situation, unique in Eastern Europe, there has occurred a convergence of Western Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and an indigenous reform movement within Orthodoxy.

Second, as distinct from treating Baptists in Georgia as a branch of the former Soviet AUCECB, this volume has, for the first time, traced the history of *Georgian* congregations of Evangelical Christians and Baptists. Third, this study argues that two key, but often-neglected, elements in mission are liturgy and a search for beauty (aesthetics). The particular character of the ECB mission experience has consistently been marked by culturally relevant liturgy and beauty. While liturgy and aesthetics have been given special attention and have become more explicit since the post-1990 ECB reforms, their foundation lies in the earlier years of the church's life. Recent political independence and ecclesial autocephaly have simply opened up a situation in which Georgia's Evangelical Christian Baptist Church has been able to freely forge its own mission and identity. ♦

Notes:

[1] Decisions of the Synod," *The Republic of Georgia*, 7 April 1995, 3. Also in *The Grace*, April 1995, 1.

[2] The Constitutional Agreement between the Georgian Autocephalous Apostolic Orthodox Church and the State

(continued on page 8)

(Tbilisi, 2001).
[3] Rodney Stark, *The Rise of Christianity*: *A Sociologist Reconsiders History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
[4] The Expanded Council of the Georgian Orthodox Church," 3.
[5] Harold J. Berman, "Freedom of Religion in Russia: An Amicus Brief for the Defendant," *Emory International Law Review* 12 (1998)," 313.
[6] N. Kvirikashvili, "Meetings with Ilia II," KN: 1992, Archives of the Evangelical Baptist Church of Georgia.
[7] Collection of Sermons, 1992-93, PA. 201, Archives of the Evangelical Baptist Church of Georgia.
[8] William Lambert, ed., *The Canons of the First Four General Councils of the Church and Those of the Early Local Greek Synods* (London: 1868).
[9] "Common Declaration of the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia and the Evangelical Baptist Church of Georgia," Tbilisi, 5 February 2001, Archives of the EBC of Georgia.
[10] E. Verady, "Mary," in *A Dictionary of European Baptist Life and Thought,* ed. J.H.Y. Briggs (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2009), 319.
[11] Ion Bria, *The Liturgy after the Liturgy: Mission and Witness from an Orthodox Perspective* (Geneva: WCC, 1996).
[12] Ilia II, "Paschal Epistle" (Tbilisi: 1995).
[13] Vladimir Fedorov, "Barriers to Ecumenism: An Orthodox View from Russia," *Religion, State and Society* 26 (No. 2, 1998), 135.
[14] Alexander Schmemann, *The Journals, 1973-1983* (New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2002), 276.
[15] Robert F. Taft, S.J., "The Great Entrance: A History of the Transfer of Gifts and Other Preanaphoral Rites," in *A History of the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom*, Vol. 2 (Rome, Pontifical Bible Institute, 1975), 3-52. See also Robert F. Taft, S.J., *Diptychs: A History of the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom* (Rome: Pontifical Bible Institute, 1991), 13-17.
[16] Robert F. Taft, "The Missionary Effort of the Eastern Churches as an Example of Inculturation" in *Le Chiese Orientali e la missione in Asia: Riflessioni in preparazione all'Assemblea Speciale del Sinododei Vescovi"* (Vatican City: 1998).
[17] Bertram Colgrave and Roger A.B. Mynors, eds., *Bede's Ecclesiastical History of the English People* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), 107.

Edited excerpts reprinted with permission from Baylor University Press from Malkhaz Songulashvili, Evangelical Christian Baptists of Georgia: The History and Transformation of a Free Church Tradition *(Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2015).*

Malkhaz Songulashvili *is Associate Professor of Comparative Theology at Ilia State University, Tbilisi, Georgia, and Metropolitan Bishop of Tbilisi of the Evangelical Baptist Church of Georgia.*

Book Review

Malkhaz Songulashvili, *Evangelical Christian Baptists of Georgia: The History and Transformation of a Free Church Tradition*. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2015. Reviewed by Sergei Filatov.

The phenomenon of Georgian Baptists is a mystery. The only explanation I can offer—and it is tentative—is that Songulashvili's Georgian Baptist Church is essentially a new denomination.

Malkhaz Songulashvili's treatment of the history and current status of the Evangelical Christian-Baptist Church is fascinating reading, the most interesting volume I have ever encountered on Baptists in the former Soviet Union. This study is compelling not only because the author is a gifted writer, but because Georgian Baptists, as far as I can tell, are a unique phenomenon.

Historically, Protestants have typically rejected popular folk religion as, by and large, pagan in origin. However, Georgian Baptists cherish various elements of Georgian popular belief. They, for example, actively incorporate popular culture into their spiritual life and worship. More so than traditional Protestantism, Catholicism, or Russian Orthodoxy, Songulashvili writes that Georgian Baptists easily have found an ally in secular art and literature. In contrast, Baptists, traditionally, have sought the truth in the Bible, not in secular novels and poetry. In this connection we meet a surprise with Georgian Baptists who not only draw upon Georgian secular culture, but upon the riches of Georgia's Orthodox culture, including its prayers, church music, candles, and vestments.

In addition, Georgian Baptists differ from most other Baptists in the area of morality and lifestyle, for example, in their acceptance of alcohol consumption. Maybe it is not the most important feature, but for many Russians (and I am Russian), the Baptist ban on alcohol has been its best-known characteristic. The ordinary Russian man in the street, meeting Songulashvili, would not believe he is a Baptist. Also, Songulashvili writes that Georgian Baptists ordain women to the priesthood.

I was surprised how much Songulashvili invoked links between his church and the Anglican Church. Perhaps in Anglicanism he finds inspiration for his religious quest. Nevertheless, Georgian Baptists still consider themselves Baptists, even though some of their beliefs and some aspects of their worship call into question their relationship with traditional Baptists in other countries, and more broadly, with other evangelicals.

Summing up, I would say the phenomenon of Georgian Baptists is a mystery. Songulashvili offers some explanations, but most of them do not seem convincing to me. The only explanation I can offer—and it is tentative—is that Songulashvili's Georgian Baptist Church is essentially a new denomination. Having arisen since the end of the Second World War, its context is an era in which the old feuds between Protestants from one side and Catholics and Orthodox from the other side are ancient history and in which religious searching in Georgia has been mainly the lot of opposition-minded intellectuals such as Malkhaz Songulashvili. ♦

Sergei Filatov, *Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia.*

Letter to the Editor

This is a really interesting issue of the *East-West Church and Ministry Report* [24 (Summer 2016)]. Thank you for your ongoing efforts to disseminate information. I find the *Report* to be an incredible resource!

I have been working off-and-on in Georgia for the past several years, but more importantly, two of our team members (Ukrainians) have worked to develop music ministries among evangelical churches in Georgia, including Baptists (non-Songulashvili), Pentecostals, and others. We also worked closely with the Franklin Graham Festival of Hope, which took place in Tbilisi in June 2014. The churches with whom we have worked all considered Malkhaz Songulashvili and his union to be an apostate church.

Further, the Georgian Orthodox Church, with whom Malkhaz has communion, actively persecutes and works against evangelical churches. In Tbilisi, this has included collaboration with behind-the-scenes forces which set fire to the building where the Festival of Hope was to take place. In addition, as one of the music directors for the Festival of Hope, I learned that several of our Georgian Orthodox musicians were threatened with excommunication (for their families as well), if any of them participated in the orchestra for the event. Though we had the official blessing and permission of the head of the Georgian Orthodox Church to hold the event, and though Malkhaz's group was also aware of the harassment, we encountered constant resistance from Georgian Orthodox believers and from some of Malkhaz's followers. In addition, signs were posted around the event labeling Franklin and his team as members of a cult and as apostates. Malkhaz did nothing to alter this view.

From my point of view Stamoolis's review [of the Songulashvili volume in the summer 2016 issue] is accurate, and I think he has raised the questions that still exist today in Georgia about Songulashvili. Namely, few of the Christians with whom I work see any call to repentance or a new way of living in the Evangelical Christian-Baptist churches led by Songulashvili. My initial response to Malkhaz was that he was looking to be culturally relevant, but I do not see this in practice. What I do see is a Georgian Orthodox Church movement in all but name, where there is worship (not veneration) of icons and a strong move away from a personal faith, where the believer has direct access to God without the mediation of a priest. ♦

Steven Benham, President, Music in World Cultures, Lawrence, Pennsylvania

Few of the Christians with whom I work see any call to repentance or a new way of living in the Evangelical Christian Baptist churches led by Songulashvili.

A Response to Songulashvili from Georgian Evangelicals

Anonymous

Malkhaz Songulashvili glosses over the persecution of Evangelicals in the early 1990s by an Orthodox vigilante priest, which was ignored by the government. The Orthodox hold the rights to the Georgian translation of the Bible and are anti-evangelistic. They will not cooperate with anyone else to reprint excerpts. Therefore, others are working on new translations.

Songulashvili's church initially split over the introduction of Orthodox liturgical elements. Those leaving created independent Baptist churches or joined Pentecostals. Another split took place about 2014 when Songulashvili adopted European liberal ideas regarding homosexuality and women priests. His cathedral is very much his own creation; the movement he hoped to start stops with him; and his following is very small. Misusing the Baptist name, he should more correctly be called Anglican.

Presently there are a few dozen Evangelical churches in Georgia. Baptists and Pentecostals work together on evangelism. The largest truly Baptist church is in Gori, pastored by the leader of Evangelism Explosion for the three Caucasus countries. ♦

Jews for Jesus in a Post-Soviet World

Avi Snyder

Editor's Note: See also Lisa Loden, "Israel's Russian Jewish Christians and Russian-Language Evangelism in Israel," East-West Church and Ministry Report *24 (Summer 2016): 11-14.*

Returning to Ukraine

In 1992 I stood outside the main train station in Odessa, Ukraine, handing out my evangelistic tracts. At one point, a Jewish woman approached me rather sheepishly, paused, and then extended her arm. "Have you seen this?" she asked in Russian. She was holding a weathered pamphlet entitled, "Can Jews Believe in Jesus as the Messiah?" I took the pamphlet from her hand and turned it over to see the publication information. It had been printed in Odessa in 1916. The author was Leonid Rosenberg, a Jewish believer in Jesus and one of a number of pioneers in the field of Jewish missions who had labored in Eastern Europe from the late 1800s to the early 20th century.[1] After a moment, the woman took the pamphlet back from me, as though she didn't trust me with it any longer. But at least for a few seconds, I'd held a tract that had been in the woman's family for three generations.

Authors like Vera Kuschnir and Kai Kjaer-Hansen have chronicled Jewish people coming to faith in Jesus in Central and Eastern Europe during the 19th century.[2] Though some "conversions" were undoubtedly just a cultural passage out of the Jewish ghetto and into mainstream European society, thousands of Jewish men and women turned to Jesus out of genuine convictions. The result was not only the establishment of messianic congregations and institutions, such as those founded by Rosenberg in Ukraine, by Joseph Rabinowitz in Moldova, and by Rabbi Isaak Lichtenstein in Hungary.

(continued on page 10)

Jews for Jesus *(continued from page 9)*

The wave of Jews embracing Jesus as the Jewish Messiah also fostered the development of a generation of Jewish-Christian scholars, notably Alfred Edersheim and David Barron, whose biblical expositions have benefitted the entire body of believers, regardless of nationality.[3]

Jews embracing Jesus did not suddenly end with the coming of the 20th century. Leonid Rosenberg's work survived up to the outbreak of the Second World War. The line of Jewish Christian witnesses and scholars continued with people such as Jakov Jocz and Rachmiel Frydland who came to faith before the war, survived the Holocaust, and significantly impacted the post-Shoah generation of Jewish believers in Jesus on an international scale.[4] My encounter outside the Odessa train station in 1992 with the Jewish woman who possessed a first-edition of one of Rosenberg's tracts reminded me of an important missiological fact: The Jews for Jesus ministry in Ukraine was by no means a "start-up;" rather, it was a "return."

Something Old, Something New

A plaque on the wall of the Jews for Jesus headquarters states in a tongue-in-cheek fashion, "Jews for Jesus -- Established 32 A.D., give or take a year." A modest familiarity with the New Testament makes it clear that all of the first followers of Jesus were His fellow Jews, including the apostles. It was Jewish missionaries like Paul who first declared the gospel to their own and then carried the Good News to the nations.

However, the current ministry called Jews for Jesus is relatively young. Our modern-day origins may be traced in part to a revival now called "the Jesus Revolution" that took place predominantly in North America from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s.[5] Though authoritative figures are not available, a significant number of Jewish men and women became followers of Jesus during that time. A core of them formed an evangelistically minded group under the leadership of a veteran missionary to the Jewish people named Moishe Rosen, and by 1973, Jews for Jesus had become an incorporated mission in the United States. Today, some 200 staff present the gospel message to the Jewish people in an open and forthright manner from mission stations in 13 countries around the world, including Israel. In Central and Eastern Europe and in the former U.S.S.R., 44 indigenous Jews for Jesus workers serve in Russia (five in Moscow), Ukraine, Belarus, Hungary, and Germany. Today messianic congregations number 80 in the Central and East European countries of Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Poland; 100 in Ukraine, 20 in Russia, and six in Belarus.

Today messianic congregations number 80 in the Central and East European countries of Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Poland; 100 in Ukraine, 20 in Russia, and six in Belarus.

Glasnost and Good News for Soviet Jews

The current work in the region began when an exploratory team visited Russia and Ukraine in 1990 at the invitation of the Evangelical Christian-Baptist Union. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* promised to provide access to the estimated 2.5 million Jewish people in the Soviet Union. This team dispatched by Jews for Jesus consisted of myself, my wife Ruth, a fellow Jews for Jesus missionary originally from Uzbekistan named Liza Terini, Dr. Eddie Elliston from the Fuller School of World Missions, and Pastor Alexander Kuzichev of the Russian Baptist church in Los Angeles, California. Our purpose was quite simple: to determine whether our high-profile methodology would "work" in the Soviet Union, and to learn whether our Jewish people would give us an open-hearted hearing. We discovered that direct proclamation did indeed work, and we found our people very responsive to the Good News. God was the architect of the genuine openness, of course. But in human terms the receptivity may be credited to a number of reasons.

The Failure of Communism

Disillusionment with Soviet ideology was deep-seated among Jewish people. In her book, *Doubly Chosen,* Judith Deutsch Kornblatt documents the fact that even before the collapse of the U.S.S.R., many Jewish intellectuals were drawn to the ceremonial beauty and transcendence of the Orthodox Church.[6] More than ever our Jewish people, like everyone else, sought to fill the ideological vacuum left in the wake of the failed Soviet experiment.

The Forbidden Fruit of Faith

The Soviet prohibition against religious instruction and assault on faith in God had turned the gospel into something like "a forbidden fruit." People, including many Jewish people, wanted to know what it was that they had not been allowed to experience.

The Thoroughness of Soviet Anti-religious Propaganda

Ironically, the nearly complete Soviet ban on biblical and religious instruction had served to shield our people from the standard objections to Jesus that we Jews from the West had heard all our lives, namely, "You can't be Jewish and believe in Jesus." In the U.S.S.R., that mantra was not as widely known or as automatically believed.

The Divide between "Jewishness" and "Judaism"

More so than in the West, Jewish people in the U.S.S.R. were already accustomed to defining Jewish identity in other than religious terms. A commitment to Jewish self-identification did not automatically carry with it a commitment to a religious identification that excluded faith in Jesus.

A Desire to Understand How Jesus Figures in Jewish History

Jewish people wanted to study Jewish history and heritage that had been denied them for more than 70 years. This included a desire to understand how Jesus figured in Jewish history: Was He, is He, the promised Jewish Messiah, or not? I remember once speaking with a Jewish couple during our first trip in 1990. They knew they were Jews, but they knew very little about being Jewish, and they knew virtually nothing about Jesus' messianic claims. At one point in our conversation, the woman confided to her husband, "We need to look into all of this."

Launching the Ministry

Encouraged by the openness that our initial findings supported, my wife and I, along with Liza Terini, moved to Odessa in September 1991 to bring the gospel to our people, and to establish an ongoing Jewish evangelistic society comprised of Soviet-born, Jesus-believing Jews. By 1998, additional mission stations had been established in Moscow, Kyiv, Kharkov, and Dnepropetrovsk, with the most recent station opening in Minsk in 2008.

We by no means acted alone. While our ministry focused on direct Jewish evangelism, like-minded Jewish evangelistic societies such as Chosen People Ministries and Ariel Ministries also came to the region to help form congregations and to disciple Jewish people who were coming to faith in cities like Kyiv and St. Petersburg. Hear O Israel Ministries conducted a series of messianic dance and music festivals in key cities throughout the former USSR, leading to the formation of even more congregations. In 1994, the Messianic Jewish Bible Institute opened in Odessa to provide training for the emerging generation of messianic leaders.

An International Advance

In a short while, the scope of all of our ministries spread beyond the borders of the former U.S.S.R. New opportunities emerged when Germany opened her doors to Jewish people who wished to emigrate from post-Soviet bloc countries. Today, Jews for Jesus has mission stations in the Ruhrgebiet and Berlin, and our evangelistic efforts serve as a complement to the congregation-planting work of Beit Sar Schalom (www.beitsarshalom.com), Evangeliumsdienst für Israel (www.edi-online.de), Swiss-based AMZI (www.amzi.org), and others.

Jews for Jesus expanded from the former U.S.S.R. not only to Germany, but also to Israel. From 1991 to the present, some 1.2 million Russian-speaking people with Jewish roots and heritage immigrated to Israel. In response to this opportunity, two Jews for Jesus missionary families redeployed to Israel in order to work alongside our Israeli team members in Tel Aviv. According to missionary reports, Russian-speaking Jewish people remain the most receptive to the gospel message among Israelis.[7]

The Fallout of Gospel Fruit – Opposition

Whenever the gospel is accurately proclaimed and accurately understood, some people receive the message, and others rise up to oppose it. Opposition typically takes the form of anti-missionary activity or anti-Semitism.

Anti-Missionary Activity

In 2000, individuals from both a secular and a religious Jewish background formed an association in Moscow called the Magen Anti-Missionary League, whose purpose is to counter our efforts. Their methods consist primarily of lodging complaints with local authorities, attempting to disrupt our assemblies and outreach activities, and seeking to dissuade our fellow Jews from listening to what we have to say. Individual acts of violence against our workers may or may not have been the result of their influence.

Anti-Semitism

Our workers often experience physical and verbal attacks of an anti-Semitic nature as we openly identify ourselves as Jews while proclaiming the Good News. However, anti-Semitism we encounter in the former U.S.S.R. differs from anti-Semitism we encounter in West European countries such as France and the United Kingdom. Today in the West, anti-Semitism is usually political or racial in nature. But in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in Ukraine and Russia, anti-Semitism often stems from an historic, *religious* anti-Jewish teaching that blames Jews in particular for the death of the Messiah. "You Jews killed Christ" is a slur that we frequently hear as we hand out our gospel tracts. Yet to identify others as being solely responsible for Jesus' death is to miss a central point of the gospel, namely, that He willingly gave His life as the payment for everyone's sins. That makes *all* humanity culpable, even as the Scripture explains (Acts 4:27; 1 Corinthians 15:3-4). People who deny their own part in Yeshua's death are denying that Jesus died for *their* sins.

"Loving Us to Hell"

We face a third form of opposition from liberal Protestant theology that holds that we Jews do not need to believe in Jesus in order to be reconciled to God. Proponents of this position oppose Jewish evangelism, arguing that, "New fellowship of Christians and Jews is possible only while respecting other convictions."[8] However, if it is true that "no one comes to the Father" except through Jesus the Son (John 14:6), then to withhold the gospel from us Jews, specifically because we are Jews, is not an act of respect. Rather, it is probably the most anti-Jewish argument that a genuine Christian can maintain.

In a post-Soviet context does this many-sided opposition affect the cause of Jewish evangelism? Certainly, real or implied "bans" from Jewish authorities can discourage Jewish people from considering the claims of the gospel. And anti-Jewish sentiments from people claiming to be Christians only reinforce the false notion that the gospel is a message of hatred directed against us Jews. Despite these impediments, Jewish people in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former U.S.S.R. remain especially open to the Good News. In Budapest, for example, our team has seen remarkable receptivity to the gospel among survivors of the Holocaust. And during a recent two-week outreach in Odessa, commemorating the 25th anniversary of the beginning of our current missionary work, a team of some 45 staff and volunteers saw 39 Jewish people and 120 non-Jews publicly profess Jesus as Messiah and Lord.

These figures from the Odessa outreach illustrate something of a "strategic edge" that we Jewish believers may have: When we Jews openly proclaim the gospel as Jews, more than just fellow Jews take note. Since the world still considers the idea of Jews

(continued on page 12)

In Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in Ukraine and Russia, anti-Semitism often stems from an historic, *religious* anti-Jewish teaching that blames Jews in particular for the death of the Messiah.

for Jesus something of an oxymoron, our high-profile evangelistic presence serves as a lightning rod, capturing the attention, not only of our own, but also that of non-Jews who may think they have "moved beyond" the need to consider the claims of Christ. A Jewish evangelistic voice strikes many as fresh and arresting.

Present and Future Challenges

In the days ahead a number of challenges will face Jews for Jesus in particular, and messianic ministries in general.

Demographics

The Jewish population in Russia and Ukraine continues to dwindle because of ongoing immigration to Israel. However, Jewish populations in Hungary and Germany remain stable. In addition, signs of a resurgent Jewish life in Poland may lead to a new evangelistic field as Polish Jewish life continues to grow.

The verdict is not yet in on how Russia's July 2016 legislation further restricting religious freedom will affect evangelism in the Russian Federation.

Reaching Jewish Millennials in the Former U.S.S.R.

Twenty-five years ago, a simple desire to know what the Bible had to say, combined with a hunger to become acquainted with a Jewish heritage that the Soviet system had repressed, worked hand-in-hand to help Jewish people discover Yeshua/Jesus, as the promised Messiah. In addition, fewer options competed with the gospel in the first decade following the collapse of the U.S.S.R. Today the situation is different for Jewish millennials. Therefore, without compromising or surrendering the integrity of the gospel message, new methodologies must be considered and employed in order to reach a generation that denies absolutes and that – despite cries for authenticity – contents itself with relationships and commitments that are shallow.

Inspiring the Second Generation

The Jewish people were given a biblical mandate to be an evangelistic light to the nations (Isaiah 43:21; Isaiah 49:6, Acts 1:8; Romans 8:29). While cherishing and maintaining our Jewish identity, we must also embrace the missionary mandate that accompanies that identity, passing that mandate on to those who follow after us. Without that sense of mandate, and without a sense of the imperative to share the gospel, Jewish missions and messianic congregations will turn inward, and the focus will shift from proclamation to preservation.

Maintaining a Jewish Identity but Avoiding Jewish Legalism

The consistent testimony of Jewish believers in Jesus—in the former U.S.S.R. as well as around the world—is that our faith in Jesus has made our Jewish identity and traditions more significant to us. The proliferation of messianic congregations throughout the former U.S.S.R. is certainly evidence of that. However, whereas a continued identification as Jews remains important, we must remain consistent to our understanding that a correct and salvific relationship with God does not depend in any way on Jewish observance but solely on repentance and faith in the finished work of Yeshua.

Maintaining Our Identity but Avoiding Separation

Though many, if not most, may prefer to worship Jesus in a Jewish cultural context, we must continue to cherish and maintain our connection to the larger body of Messiah. Messianic Jews need the edification that comes from association with our non-Jewish brothers and sisters in Christ. Similarly, followers of Jesus who are not Jewish will only benefit if their association with messianic Jews leads to a deeper appreciation of the Jewish roots of our Christian faith. In short, we need each other.

A Resurgent Legal Threat

The verdict is not yet in on how Russia's July 2016 legislation further restricting religious freedom will affect evangelism in the Russian Federation. Central to the work of Jews for Jesus is the open proclamation of the gospel, without which we cease being Jews bearing witness to Jesus as our Messiah. Whatever circumstances await, we Jews for Jesus understand that we are irrevocably called to declare the gospel "to the Jew first, and also to the Greek" (Romans 1:16). By God's grace, we will endeavor to remain faithful to that call. ♦

Notes:

[1] Vera Kuschnir, Only One Life: a Story of Missionary Resilience: Biography of Leon Rosenberg, the Late Founder and Director of the American European Bethel Mission. (Broken Arrow, OK : Slavic Christian Pub., 1996).

[2] Kai Kjaer-Hansen, *Joseph Rabinowitz and the Messianic Movement: the Herzl of Jewish Christianity* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995).

[3] Alfred Edersheim, *The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah* (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1999), *The Temple: Its Ministry and Services as They Were at the Time of Jesus Christ* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1958), and David Baron, *The Servant of Jehova: The Sufferings of the Messiah and the Glory That Should Follow* (London:Marshall, Morgan, 1954).

[4] See Rachmiel Frydland, *When Being Jewish Was a Crime* (Nashville,TN: Thomas Nelson, 1978) and Jakob Jocz, *The Jewish People and Jesus Christ* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1949 and 1979).

[5] *Time Magazine* 97 (21 June 1971).

[6] Judith Deutsch Kornblatt, *Doubly Chosen: Jewish Identity, the Soviet Intelligentsia, and the Russian Orthodox Church* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004).

[7] For reports from our Israeli field, contact the author: avi.snyder@jewsforjesus.org.

[8] Gabriela Wunderlich, "Streitpunkt: Mission unter Juden," *Pro Christiches Medienmagazin Kirche,* 17 December 2014; http://www.pro-medienmagazin.de/gesellschaft/kirche/detailansicht/aktuell/streitpunkt-mission-unter-juden -90511/.

Avi Snyder *is European Director for Jews for Jesus, based in Budapest, Hungary.*

Orthodox-Evangelical Conversations in Moscow: An Orthodox Perspective

Sergey Koryakin

A series of meetings between Orthodox and Evangelical Christians is currently being held in Moscow. This is not the first attempt to bring Russian Christians of different traditions together; since the famous Volga 1992 joint evangelistic campaign, several meetings were held (mostly in the mid-1990s), gathering people of one mind and heart to discuss the issues that cause division between them and to explore ways of doing mission together. For some, the meetings became a starting point for lasting friendships.

Nearly 20 years later, another opportunity for interdenominational dialogue came about through the Lausanne-Orthodox Initiative (LOI); http://www.loimission.net. Established in 2010, LOI organized three consecutive international consultations, 2013-15, two in Albania and one in Finland, to be followed up by participants continuing Orthodox-Evangelical dialogues in their home countries. Having been inspired by the LOI mission statement "to work towards better understanding and encourage reconciliation and healing where wounds exist," some of the Russian Orthodox participants resolved to create a similar discussion platform in Russia.

A new series of meetings began in May 2015, hosted by *Vstrecha* [Meeting] Christian Center. Attendees have included clergy and laity from Sts. Kosma and Damian Orthodox Church, Evangelie [The Gospel] Baptist Church, Dom Otsa [The Father's Home] Pentecostal Church, Tushino Evangelical Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Augsburg Confession, and others. Some of the old friends from the 1990s had a chance to reconnect and to reflect on the past experience as well as the challenges for mission generated by the society and culture of present-day Russia. All the participants shared a strong feeling that the time for such meetings had come, and that both sides in the dialogue had reached the point that they have no right to stay divided.

From the beginning, by general agreement, it was decided that only leaders of local church communities would participate. Since a considerable mutual tension exists between Russian Orthodox and Protestants, organizers and participants were not ready to deal with a sizeable and divided audience. It is expected that leaders, with the experience of earlier meetings, will be more successful in promoting understanding and tolerance in their parishes and congregations.

The topics of the six meetings to date have included Protestant and Orthodox understandings of repentance, Church tradition, and the nature of the Church. The March 2016 session dealt with the issue of Church identity and boundaries, that is, the factors that allow a community of believers to be called a part of the one and true Church. The main goal is not to eliminate all theological tensions, but to create a spiritual atmosphere of mutual trust, friendship, and support. ♦

A series of meetings between Orthodox and Evangelical Christians is currently being held in Moscow.

Sergei Koryakin *is completing his Kandidat degree at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences and teaches at Moscow Evangelical Christian Seminary, Moscow, Russia.*

Orthodox-Evangelical Conversations in Moscow: A Protestant Perspective

Johan Maurer

"I'm not interested in a museum of denominational peculiarities. I hope that together we can look seriously for Christian answers to this moment in history." Alexander Fedichkin, a Baptist pastor, musician, and president of the Russian Evangelical Alliance, was speaking in Moscow on 7 February 2016 toward the end of a "fraternal meeting" of Russian Orthodox and Protestant theologians, seminary professors, and local church leaders. This gathering of about two dozen believers, half Russian Orthodox and half Protestant, with some Roman Catholic representation as well, met six times over the past year, with plans to continue gathering monthly or bi-monthly.

Roots

The roots of these meetings go back a quarter-century to the 1990s. Several of those who participate now were part of that original fellowship. In those early days, they met not just for discussion, but as a joint and public witness for Christian unity. Public enthusiasm for inter-confessional contact since those early post-Soviet years is at a low ebb for a variety of reasons. Among many grassroots and regional leaders, Orthodox and Protestant alike, the word "ecumenism" is avoided like the plague. For years, these particular inter-confessional conversations went dormant.

The Christian Cultural Center "*Vstrecha*"

But the dream was not lost. Some of the original participants persisted in believing that "the things that unite us Christians are more important than the things that divide us" (a phrase I heard at both gatherings I have attended), and they succeeded in attracting friends and colleagues to revive these consultations. The Christian Cultural Center "*Vstrecha*" [Meeting] warmly welcomed participants to its premises near Moscow's Danilovsky Monastery, providing its already long-standing ministry of hospitality and encouragement to this revived initiative. In fact, the director of the center, Karina Chernyak, was the one who invited me to begin attending. She and I

(continued on page 14)

previously were among the participants in an annual conference dedicated to the theological and spiritual heritage of Father Alexander Men', whose ecumenical warmth, immense pastoral concern, and urgent focus on Christian literacy, continue to inspire wide varieties of Christians worldwide, over a quarter-century after his assassination.

Having accepted the invitation, I made my way to the "*Vstrecha*" Center and immediately realized this was not my first visit to the place. Some five years before, several of my fellow Quakers and I had been invited for a regular seminar under the sponsorship of an Orthodox young adults' fellowship. We were asked to explain the mechanics and the spiritual basis of Friends' church governance. This time, as soon as I stepped through the doorway, memories of that earlier experience of warmth, acceptance, and readiness for mutual learning came back to me. Even more delightfully, Dmitri Ivanin, the man who had invited us to the young adults' gathering five years ago, was among those welcoming me that evening.

Strong biblical convictions and generous Christian hospitality can coexist, though not without (at times) serious controversies.

Protestant and Orthodox Reflections on Repentance

Not that we were simply basking in sentimentality and warm memories. Our theme at last month's gathering was "repentance" in all its awkward theological angularity. A Protestant pastor began by explaining the role of repentance in the formation of a believer, as understood by most Protestants, and by confessing candidly the major divisions among Protestants in interpreting these crucial doctrines. Two Russian Orthodox speakers ably represented both the doctrinal and the devotional realities of repentance in Orthodox tradition. I sat there, barely daring to believe that we could, as Russian Orthodox and Protestant believers, have such freedom and love to delve into these supremely important concerns for three solid hours without a break.

At the end of that session, we talked about our hopes for the future of the fellowship. There was heartfelt agreement that discussion was not enough; as Fedichkin's words implied, there needs to be engagement with developments on the wider stage. I was reminded of William Temple's famous words, "Church is the only society on earth that exists for the benefit of non-members." Simply rehearsing our respective denominational conceits contributes little if anything to that mission. We also agreed that the first priority toward that vision would be a more central place for prayer in our life as a fellowship.

The Meaning of "One, Holy Catholic, and Apostolic Church"

We met again on 20 March 2016, and again we engaged with a powerful theme: "'The One, Holy Catholic, and Apostolic Church': What Does This Mean?" The stakes are nothing less than the defining of boundaries and entryways of the Kingdom of God. Vladimir Strelov, the Orthodox speaker from the parish of Sts. Kosma and Damien, gave us a wonderful toolbox of historical turning points and unresolved dilemmas to explore what it means to be the Holy Nation, the Royal Priesthood, the Body of Christ. In turn, Pastor Pavel Begichev of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Augsburg Confession, led us through a sometimes hilarious and sometimes poignant exercise in boundary-drawing as Christians have practiced it from the very beginning—from the most expansive understanding of the people of God to the most exclusive. Both speakers helped us understand how strong biblical convictions and generous Christian hospitality can coexist, though not without (at times) serious controversies. I had the intuition that, in our own diversity among the two dozen of us present, we were a laboratory for that coexistence—both its challenges and its blessings. It's my hope that this kind of exchange can prepare us for wider influence on behalf of the Gospel invitation ("Repent AND believe the Good News") in a time when exclusion and false witness seem to be the order of the day. ♦

Johan Maurer *(www.maurers.org) is a member of the Moscow Friends Meeting and lives in Elektrostal, Russia.*

Letter to the Editor

Where Would the Keston Archive Be Without Chris Marsh?

As social scientists who have long been involved in Russian studies with special interest and concern for religion, we were pleased to see the article on the value and potential of the Keston Archive by Wallace Daniel in the spring [2016] issue of the *East-West Church and Ministry Report*. The Keston Archive contains a wealth of historical documentation, and Professor Daniel's presentation on the uses that can be made of this important collection is helpful to all researchers. We applaud Professor Daniel's own contributions to scholarship in this area and his long-term support of the Keston Archive.

The account does not note in any way the important role played by Christopher Marsh, the political science scholar who was the Baylor point person in arranging for the Archive's trans-Atlantic voyage from England to Texas. It is as if the period 2007-2011 had no consequence, and Marsh appears to have become a non-person.

However, the account that he presented of the move of the Archive from Oxford, England, to Baylor University, Waco, Texas, does not note in any way the important role played by Christopher Marsh, the political science scholar who was the Baylor point person in arranging for the Archive's trans-Atlantic voyage from England to Texas. It is as if the period 2007-2011 had no consequence, and Marsh appears to have become a non-person. On the other hand, we remember the excitement that surrounded the move and the energy that Chris gave to the project.

We also note that Chris used the Archive in his own work and valued it highly. Perhaps the best example was the book he published on *Religion and the State in Russia and China* (2011). The Keston Center/ Archive meshed well with Marsh's other positions at Baylor as director of the J. M. Dawson Institute for Church-State Studies, as director of the (now-defunct) graduate program in church-state studies, and as editor of the *Journal of Church and State*, the leading journal in this critically important area.

Marsh shared the fundamental values of religious and political freedom and upheld them diligently in his roles at the time. Chris Marsh has moved on—he currently teaches at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas—but his legacy at Baylor in facilitating the Keston Archive move to Baylor and in setting up the institutional foundation for its availability and use by scholars should not be overlooked.♦

Jerry G. Pankhurst, *Wittenberg University, Springfield, Ohio*

Vyacheslav Karpov, *Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan*

Bucharest Conference on Refugee Ministry in Europe

Charley Warner

"Refugees in Europe—a Fence or a Bridge?" was the subject of the European Evangelical Mission Association (EEMA) conference (www.europeanema.org) held in Bucharest, Romania, 21-24 June 2016. Conference topics included the source, transit, and final destination of refugees to Europe, as well as the ways in which Christian ministries assist them. Presenters came not only from Europe but also from Syria, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and South Sudan. While the program focused on Western Europe's reception of refugees from Africa and the Middle East, some sessions also addressed ministry to refugees in Central and Eastern Europe.

Martin Lee, Executive Director of Global Connections in the United Kingdom, helped participants better understand the historical and legal definitions of *refugees* and *internally displaced persons (IDPs)*. According to current international law, IDPs are not officially designated as refugees. This fact plays an important role in the international community's lack of understanding of IDPs in Ukraine and Russia as a result of the war in eastern Ukraine. It is estimated that over 1.5 million people are IDPs in Ukraine, with possibly another 200,000 in Russia. Fortunately, Ukrainian evangelical and other churches are playing a major role in caring for these IDPs.

Hungary historically has been hostile to refugees within its borders. However, this is beginning to change. Matthew Paschall helps to coordinate the City Network for Refugee Ministries in Budapest, Hungary, a network of 20 ministries and local churches working together with the Hungarian Evangelical Alliance to minister to refugees. This network, which Paschall describes as "comparable to a medical triage," not only ministers to those in refugee camps and detention centers, but also trains Hungarian pastors and other Christians to minister to refugees.

Kari Tassia's presentation on the Refugee Highway Network (RHN) described this NGO's work in linking various refugee ministries along the journey from refugees' home countries to their new places of residence. The next RHN Roundtable will be 6-10 February 2017, in Budapest, Hungary. The Roundtable's goal is to aid churches in Central Europe in building bridges of hope instead of fences of exclusion. ♦

Charley Warner *is a missionary serving with Barnabas International in Central Europe and Eurasia. He was a member of the board of EEMA from 2009 to 2013.*

Where Does the Russian Orthodox Church Get Its Money? *(continued from page 16)*

cathedral's assembly hall and conference rooms are also available for rent. Based on state prices, these revenue sources can bring in up to $675,000 a year.

However, the cathedral and the surrounding area belong officially not to the Russian Orthodox Church, but to the City of Moscow, and are managed by a non-profit organization—the Christ the Savior Cathedral Fund. This Fund, as well, receives subsidies from the city administration. A total of $9.4 million from this fund was allocated for the "maintenance" of the cathedral between January 2010 and September 2012. ♦

Based on investigative reports from RBK, Vedomosti, and Newsland.

This edited article is reprinted with permission from Russia Behind the Headlines, *9 March 2016.*

Anna Kuchma *is a reporter for* Russia Behind the Headlines, *Moscow, Russia.*

Where Does the Russian Orthodox Church Get Its Money?

Anna Kuchma

The Russian Orthodox Church is not only a religious organization, but also a large corporation that does business.

The Russian Orthodox Church is not only a religious organization, but also a large corporation that does business. According to unofficial data provided by sociologist Nikolai Mitrokhin and published by *Kommersant*, the total annual income of the Russian Orthodox Church in the first decade of the 21st century is estimated at $500 million rubles ($7 million).

Between 2000 and 2009 sources for the Church's revenues were as follows: 55 percent from commercial enterprises, 40 percent from sponsorship donations, and five percent contributed by dioceses. According to the *Newsland* website, in 2010 the Russian Orthodox Church—via a network of affiliated companies—actively traded in BMW cars as a co-founder of BMW Rusland, together with BMW Austria.

According to the Federal Tax Service, in 2014 the Russian Orthodox Church received $75.7 million in revenue from ceremonies, sales of religious literature, and donations. All this income is untaxed. (The data for 2015 are not yet available.) By 2014 sponsorship donations had decreased, while contributions from dioceses made up between a third and a half of the Church's total budget, according to Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, head of the Department for the Cooperation of Church and Society until the end of 2015, in comments made to business daily *RBK*.

Big Business

So what are the various income streams that make the Russian Orthodox Church so wealthy? One of the main sources of income for the Moscow Patriarchate is the Sofrino Plant, a factory producing church furniture, various utensils, icons, and candles—many different types of goods costing from a few rubles to 1.5 million rubles ($20,000). According to priests, dioceses strongly recommend that they make purchases from Sofrino. As a result, the plant supplies ecclesiastical products to up to half of all Russian churches.

The Russian Orthodox Church's sphere of interests also includes medical supplies, jewelry, and the rental of meeting rooms, as well as agriculture and the marketing of ritual services, *Vedomosti* business daily has reported. According to the SPARK database of Russian companies (www.ispark.ru), the Moscow Patriarchate is also the owner of Ritual Orthodox Service, with earnings of $740,000 in 2014. The Church, in addition, also generates revenue from two Moscow hotels—the Universitetskaya and the Danilovskaya. The income of the latter amounted to 112 million rubles ($1.5 million) in 2014.

The Church's regional branches, its dioceses, are also involved in the industrial sector. For instance, the Yekaterinburg Diocese previously owned a large granite quarry, while Kemerovo Diocese is the sole owner of the KSK Building Company, as well as a co-owner of the Novokuznetsk Computer Center and the advertising agency, Evropa Media Kuzbass.

Core Revenues

Churches in Russia generate their basic income from the sale of candles, but also earn revenue from donations for the performance of religious rites. Candles for the Russian Orthodox Church are molded in dozens of workshops, using as raw materials not only new wax or paraffin, but also used candle ends. The cost of the production of a candle is dozens of times lower than the price it is sold for in the church. The monthly revenue of churches ranges between $70 and $40,500. Part of the income (10-15 percent) made by Russia's 34,000 Orthodox churches is passed to their dioceses, of which there are about 300 in Russia. Dioceses, in turn, transfer 15 per cent of these contributions to the Moscow Patriarchate.

In addition, the state assists the Church. In 2012-2015, the Russian Orthodox Church and its associated structures received 14 billion rubles ($189.2 million) from the state. The state budgeted 2.6 billion rubles ($35.1 million) for the Russian Orthodox Church for 2016. The state gives money to the Church as part of federal programs related to the development of spiritual and educational centers, as well as the conservation and restoration of churches.

The Cathedral of Christ the Savior

Income from the Russian Orthodox Church's main cathedral in Moscow, the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, is also part of the Moscow Patriarchate's revenue. It is just not clear whose. In addition to the cathedral itself, its grounds host a car wash, a dining area, a dry cleaning shop, a laundry, and a paid underground parking lot for 305 cars. The

(continued on page 15)

The quarterly ***East-West Church &Ministry Report*** examines all aspects of church life and mission outreach in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe as a service to both church and academia. Letters to the editor are welcomed. Annual subscription rates are $49.95 (individuals, U.S. and Canada); $59.95 (individuals, international); $53.95 (libraries, U.S. and Canada); $63.95 (libraries, international); and $22.95 (e-mail). Reprint and photocopy policy: 1) Quantity photocopies or reprints of up to three articles from a single issue may be distributed or reprinted at no charge. 2) Written permission is to be secured for each distribution or reprinting. 3) The following statement is to be carried on each photocopied article reproduced and each article reprinted: Reproduced (or Reprinted) with permission of the ***East-West Church & Ministry Report***. Indexed by *American Bibliography of Slavic and East* European Studies (ABSEES), *OCLC Public Affairs Information Service* (formerly *PAIS), Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI)*, and *Christian Periodicals Index*.

ASBURY UNIVERSITY
Established 1890

East-West Church & Ministry Report
Asbury University
One Macklem Drive
Wilmore, KY 40390
Tel: 859-858-2427
E-mail: emark936@gmail.com
Website: www.eastwestreport.org
Mark R. Elliott, Editor
Ray Prigodich, Book Review Editor