An Interview with Vitaly Sorokun

Raised in Kharkiv [Russian: Kharkov], Vitaly Sorokun is both pastor of New Hope Baptist Church and an associate professor at Yaroslav the Wise National Law University in that city. His PhD dissertation (2009) examined international protection of freedom of religion or belief.

 Kharkiv is situated in northeastern Ukraine, less than an hour from the border with Russia, and the local population is largely Russianspeaking. Unlike parts of neighboring Donetsk and Luhansk regions, attempts by pro-Russian separatists to take control of the city in 2014 did not succeed. 

In addition to his native Russian, Vitaly speaks fluent Ukrainian, French, and English. The following conversation with the editor of the East-West Church Report occurred in the last of these. It took place in downtown Kharkiv in mid-October 2018. 

How did you become a Baptist pastor? 

hShortly after the Soviet Union collapsed, when we saw the first fruits of freedom of religion, I was studying at the school of languages of what was then called Kharkov State University. All of a sudden there were many conversations about faith, Christianity, and the Bible. Many missionaries were coming from the West and introducing Christianity to us. I began to search and went to many churches—Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant—just to observe and find answers. At the same time, someone gave me a Bible, and I began to read it. I felt more comfortable in Protestant churches, and I liked a more conservative type of service, so I stayed with the Baptist Church. That is where I gave my life to Jesus Christ. 

Later on, while in my PhD law program, I began to grow spiritually and to preach at the church. That got me moving into a pastor’s role. In 2001 we planted a new church, and I withdrew from my PhD program to focus my attention there. In 2005, once the church was growing and its administration more stable, I returned to the PhD program. It was funny—by that time I was already an ordained pastor, and historically Yaroslav the Wise University was a KGB school. So when I went to reenroll, many eyebrows were raised: “Are we training clergy here now?!” 

Tell me about your church, New Hope [Russian: Novaia Nadezhda].

We are a Baptist church, part of the Baptist Union here. There are at least 80 Baptist churches in Kharkiv region, and around 4,000 members altogether. Overall, the Baptist Union of Ukraine is the largest in Europe, and we are the oldest Protestant group in this part of the world. In this area, our history goes back around 160 years. 

Right now, New Hope Church focuses primarily on international students. Our services are in English, and we have a congregation of about 100. Most come from African countries and the Middle East; there are also a few from India. We have additional services in Chinese for a separate congregation of some 50 students from China. 

We never actually thought about this in the beginning. We were just a church for Russian-speaking Ukrainians, but one Easter Sunday three students from Uganda came looking for a church, and we discovered there was nowhere they could worship in English. We interpreted our services for them, and they started coming. 

Soon we saw that this was where God was moving, and we redirected the entire vision of our church. Kharkiv receives the second-largest number of international students in Ukraine—approximately 23,000 a year. We try to create a place where they are loved and feel safe. 

When all is said and done, they are with us for only three to six years. We have accomplished our mission when they go back home as “God’s workers approved and unashamed, rightly handling the word of truth” [2 Timothy 2:15]. We have been doing this ministry for 17 years. I have had the chance to go to Africa a few times—to Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda—and meet with our graduates who are now doctors and business professionals. They have such deep faith, and they are now upcoming leaders of their societies. We were able to shape them in the formative stages of their life and to give them a solid foundation. We are grateful for that. 

The religious diversity in Ukraine is striking. How far is this supported by legislation on freedom of conscience?

 Ukraine has always had this religious dynamic. It is a melting pot of religions. Historically, just among Christians, we have had various Orthodox, Greek Catholics [whose worship is similar to Orthodoxy, but who recognize the Pope], and also Roman Catholics, if not so many. We had Lutherans in Kharkiv for many years. And when you look at Evangelicals—especially Baptists—Ukraine had the largest number even in Soviet times. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine began sending missionaries to Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union.

By God’s grace, we have been enjoying tremendous freedom of conscience. Not counting the Baltic States, Ukraine has been the former Soviet republic that has enjoyed this freedom the most. We have a very progressive law on freedom of conscience and religious organizations, adopted in 1991 and still in force. We have had positive Church-state relations. 

Of course, this has depended upon the time period. We actually experienced a tightening-up under the regime of Viktor Yanukovych [president from 2010-14]. Yanukovych was clearly pro-Russian, pro-Putin, and pro-Orthodox. He did not change the religion law, but every law is written in such a way that it depends upon how you implement it. You can implement it by giving people a tremendous margin of freedom, but you can also claim that there is freedom when everything is tightly controlled, as is the case in Russia now. They have freedom, but can you move without being supervised? That is a different matter. That is what they tried to do here under Yanukovych. We no longer have the KGB, but the security service of Ukraine, the SBU. While Yanukovych was in power, an officer of the SBU would call me three or four times a year trying to arrange a meeting to get information from me, mostly about pastors. Did I know why an American team came to a particular church? Were they planning big events for the city, like rallies or congresses?

Were any foreign missionaries staying here? If so, who were they, and how long would they be staying? What was the purpose of their visit, and what was their schedule? Those kinds of questions. However, since the collapse of the Yanukovych regime in 2014 with the Revolution of Dignity, I’ve never had a call, thankfully. It surprises me how much President Poroshenko and his administration have been open to Protestants. We are able to represent ourselves at the highest level of society. For two consecutive years we have celebrated Thanksgiving Day right on Khreshchatyk Street in central Kyiv. Over 100,000 people are said to have attended in the second year. [See the East-West Church Report, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2018, 15-16]

President Poroshenko strongly backs the creation of a Ukrainian Orthodox Church not subject to Russian political influence. How did the situation differ under Yanukovych? 

Under Yanukovych it was quite the opposite. Patriarch Kirill came here regularly from Russia; the Moscow Patriarchate was building churches and given freedoms no one else enjoyed. Then, when unrest began in eastern Ukraine, it was no secret that [Moscow Patriarchate] priests were telling their flock whom to support. There was only one option: to support Moscow, Russia, pro-Putin candidates, whereas by law, Church and state are separate. I cannot use my pulpit to tell people whom to vote for. That was wrong, and people did not like it at all. Now society is swinging in the opposite direction. 

There is already a bill seeking to force the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Moscow to change its name to reflect its affiliation with the Russian Orthodox Church. [Subsequent to this interview, on 20 December 2018, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted corresponding amendments to the religion law (Bill No. 5309). According to these, a religious organization operating in Ukraine with headquarters in an “aggressor state”—defined  as Russia—must change its name to reflect this affiliation. Such a religious organization may also not conduct military chaplaincy.] 

When this bill first appeared it was written in neutral terms, as imposing some limitations and special requirements on religious organizations with centers outside Ukraine. But everyone knew it was a bill against the Moscow Patriarchate; they would have to re-register in a special way. It was curbing religious freedom. 

If passed in its original form, it would have affected others, because are not the Catholics in the same situation? What about the Lutherans, even the Baptists? We are autonomous, but we have so many ties to the West. Who can say that my center is not in Ukraine, but Frankfurt, Germany, or Dallas, Texas? You cannot prove that. 

It is actually similar to Russia, where legislation often appears designed to target particular groups.

When you have a revolutionary mindset, the pressing needs of today can justify anything. That is how they justified persecution in the past against a particular group or class: “The bourgeoisie are the guilty ones.” Now it’s, “Let’s make these Orthodox believers the guilty ones.” Well, no, you don’t do that. Especially against one particular group, that is discrimination. No matter what the revolution, you must protect and guarantee basic human rights and freedoms. 

Our government does know that, and they are not so stupid as to lose the support of Europe over something like this. But this idea of an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church is everywhere just now; the president talks about it, and the Prime Minister, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the one hand, I understand that it is a positive dynamic if the Orthodox Church can be independent, especially if its leading metropolitan need only be appointed locally, rather than having to be approved in Russia, now an aggressor state. 

But where I see red flags rising: Isn’t there too much involvement of the government in these affairs? I understand that it is rather like international affairs: You have to obtain that tomos from Istanbul, you can’t just fly there and meet with the Patriarch [of Constantinople] without politics being involved. But after this is done, what will the situation look like for the churches under Moscow? Will they have to re-register? Will they have to change their name? 

And what will it mean for the general religious landscape of Ukraine? In the long term, will the autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church claim, as in Greece, that they are the historical, the state Church? They will have all the balls in their court to say it, and even to begin demanding changes to the Constitution. They are not going to do that now, but what about 20 or more years down the road, when the dust has settled? How will that affect the Protestants? How will that affect the Muslims and the rest? This is what has to be considered. If Ukraine is to develop as a liberal state—as a state that guarantees human rights and freedoms—there must be some balance, otherwise we actually could go to the other extreme. 

There are already fears of disputes over church property. 

Hopefully they will be peaceful, just within the courts. But even then, how can a court be neutral in this situation, when it is all so political, so emotionally charged? Let’s say a case is filed in court, and the judge decides to transfer a church building. If he takes it from the Moscow Patriarchate, it will be called discrimination. But if he does not give it to the Kyiv Patriarchate [subsumed into the new Orthodox Church of Ukraine in the months following this interview], he will be acting against the overall dynamic of the country.

The issue is especially difficult to resolve when Orthodox parishes do not have a fixed membership. They were actually considering adopting other legislation, and thankfully did not, under which fixed membership could not determine the current state of your congregation, only personal attachment to it. That would have caused a tremendous threat to everybody. Let’s say we have 50 church members, and they decide our affairs. What if 100 physically fit young men come to my church service one day and say, “This is our church, and we’ll be voting.” Who are you? “Well, you don’t know us, but we feel attached, and we are the majority right now, so we’re taking control.” That would be insane. I’m thankful that the current law does have a provision stating that the government does not interfere in the internal statute of the church or how we make decisions. 

Overall though, it is sad to me as a Christian that there are these fights, as people may easily lose the most important thing. What matters is that you have Jesus Christ as the foundation of the Church. When you lose that, you get into all sorts of fights. Let’s say I’m under Constantinople, and my friend is under Moscow. Now that the Moscow Church proclaims that it doesn’t have any ties with Constantinople, does that mean we can’t even pray with one another when we eat together? 

Jesus said to love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you [Matt. 5:44]. I hope the priests teach parishioners in the Orthodox churches that, because if a person is so charged emotionally, it is easy to begin actually hating. I pray that both Moscow and Constantinople would keep Jesus as the foundation and work from that, rather than dividing. Jesus said, “If anyone wants to take your shirt, give them your coat as well. If anyone forces you to go one mile, go with them two miles” [Matt. 5:40- 41]. That should be the spirit. If they take your building, just give it. You can always build a building. Show them you are the owner, and that you are free to give, and God will bless. If you come to people with an open hand, the Lord will put something back in your hand. But if you come with a clenched fist, God can’t put anything in it.