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Volume 15, No. 1

Integrating Poland Into Europe: Will it Lead to Polish Secularization or a Spiritual Revival in Europe?

José Casanova

The Polish Episcopate, nevertheless, has enthusiastically accepted the papal apostolic assignment and repeatedly stressed that one of its goals upon Poland’s rejoining Europe is “to restore Europe for Christianity.” While this may sound preposterous to Western European ears, such a message has found resonance in the tradition of Polish messianism. Barring a radical change in the European secular Zeitgeist, however, such an evangelistic effort has little chance of success. Given the loss of demand for religion in Western Europe, the supply of surplus Polish pastoral resources for a European-wide evangelizing effort is unlikely to prove effective. The at-best lukewarm, if not outright hostile, European response to John Paul’s II’s renewed calls for a European Christian revival point to the difficulties of the assignment.

Disproving the Secularization Thesis

A less ambitious, though no less arduous, apostolic assignment could perhaps have equally remarkable effects. Let Poland itself prove the secularization thesis wrong. Let it keep faith with its Catholic identity and tradition while succeeding in its integration into Europe, thus becoming a “normal” European country. Such an outcome, if feasible, could suggest that the decline of religion in Europe might not be a process necessarily linked with modernization, but rather a historical choice Europeans have made. A modern religious Poland could perhaps force secular Europeans to rethink their secularist assumptions and realize that it is not so much Poland that is out of sync with modern trends, but rather secular Europe that is out of sync with the rest of the world. Granted, such a provocative scenario is merely meant to break the spell secularism holds over the European mind and the social sciences. 

Edited excerpt reprinted with permission from José Casanova, “Religion, European Secular Identities and European Integration” in Religion in the New Europe, ed. by Krzysztof Michalski (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2006), 24-26.

José Casanova is professor of sociology at New School University, New York, New York. His work focuses on religion, democratization, and social change in Southern and Eastern Europe

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Volume 15, No. 1

The Crisis in Evangelical Christian-Baptist Theological Education in the Former Soviet Union

Oleg P. Turlac

Admissions Shortfall

In the last several years theological schools in the former Soviet Union have been confronted with a shortage of applicants. Many seminary leaders have been taken by surprise. As one asked, “Why don’t young people come to study? There is such freedom and a great opportunity to learn the Bible! Why don’t they take advantage of this freedom?” The trustees of one well-known institution were so concerned over the low number of entering students they called on a consulting team from the Euro-Asian Accrediting Association to assist in overcoming the enrollment crisis. Changes in the seminary’s leadership followed.

Why do schools in the former Soviet Union lack applicants while the need for pastors and Bible teachers is still great? According to figures provided by the Baptist World Alliance (September, 2006), the 1,776 Baptist churches in the Russian Federation are served by only 700 pastors (roughly 2.5 churches per pastor). In the past year alone, 66 new Baptist churches were founded in Russia, yet no appropriate placement service is in place to match graduates with church openings (“BWA News,” 6 September 2006, electronic mailing).

The low number of applicants to the College of Theology and Education (CTE), the leading Baptist school in Moldova, can be explained by looking at the country-wide situation. Moldova faces a crisis in its educational system as a whole. In 2006-07 many state scholarships provided for secular institutions of higher education went unused for lack of applicants. Many young people are dissatisfied with the huge investment of time and money that higher education requires in return for a low quality of instruction and poor job prospects for graduates. Many choose instead to be employed in other European countries, where most jobs that do not require prior education pay much more than jobs at home that require higher education. Tatyana, a 25-year-old graduate of the state university in Kishinev, Moldova, said, “I worked hard for my teaching degree, yet when I was looking for employment, nothing was available but a low-paying teaching job in a village school. It is much easier for me to go to Italy to make a living there.” The same outlook may be found among graduates of seminaries and Bible colleges: “Why should I invest time and money in training if theological education is not required for ordination and church ministry?” In spite of the fact that CTE averages 30 graduates per year, close to 100 Baptist churches in Moldova still lack pastors.

The crisis in theological education in the former Soviet Union could have been anticipated. A meeting of the Consulting Committee on Theological Education of the Russian Evangelical Christian-Baptist Union in March, 2005, noted the lack of applicants, the non-involvement of many graduates in church ministry, and the lack of interest of local churches in hiring seminary graduates (Minutes of the Consulting Committee on Theological Education of the Russian Evangelical Christian-Baptist Union, Moscow, Russia, 25 March seminaries to be “Western business enterprises.” In the past 15 years, only a few schools have emerged based on local initiative and financial support. Also, many Baptist churches and associations still do not have a sense of ownership of theological institutions, because they usually are not involved in the financial support of the schools. Quite often a local minister’s involvement in the life of a seminary is limited to writing a letter of reference for a potential candidate for admission. Finally, in spite of the graduation of hundreds of students with degrees in theology and ministry, many churches prefer to ordain uneducated laymen because they are more “like them.” Such ministers do not ask for financial support because they hold a job, unlike seminary graduates. Churches fear theological education and often associate it with atheistic training which led people away from God. They still prefer “simplicity and authenticity” in preaching and Bible teaching instead of complicated theological terms and exegesis of a text. Unfortunately, having a theological degree quite often serves as a disadvantage when a church considers a person for ordination.

The Way Forward

What steps should be taken to confront the crisis? First, theological schools should reevaluate their mission and vision. Each school should meet with its association or union of churches to discuss the purpose for the existence of the school and the issue of ministry placement. Second, the curriculum should be revised to offer more courses dealing directly with preparation for ministry. Third, church unions should establish placement committees and databases that would match churches seeking pastors with graduates of Bible colleges and seminaries. Fourth, seminary and union leaders should exert every effort to connect schools to churches, inviting pastors to special educational events and chapel services and assigning pastors as mentors to students who desire to acquire pastoral experience. Fifth, theological schools should not wait passively for the arrival of new students, but should design programs to reach out to would-be seminary students. This requires strengthening the admissions, recruitment, and public relations departments, which in many schools are poorly funded or are nonexistent. Finally, schools should consider directing their focus not only to the training of future pastors, but also to training for those already in ministry. This will require change in academic requirements and the transfer of some programs from full-time to part-time status. Such a shift would likely entail a reevaluation of graduation requirements, tailoring instruction for the benefit of more part-time students, and more non-residential instruction.

If decisive steps are not taken, it is likely that the number of applicants will continue to decline and that only a few schools will survive the crisis. No theological school in the former USSR today should be satisfied with the status quo. Reevaluation of the state of theological education is an absolute necessity.

Oleg P. Turlac is dean of extension studies and instructor of theology and spiritual formation at the College of Theology and Education, Kishinev, Moldova. He holds a doctor of ministry degree from Samford University, Birmingham, Alabama, U.S.A.

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Volume 15, No. 1

The Reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior

Zoe Knox

Moscow’s immense Cathedral of Christ the Savior is visible testimony to the Orthodox Church’s position at the forefront of national spiritual and political life. Tsar Aleksandr I decreed that a cathedral be built to commemorate the Russian forces’ victory over Napoleon’s invaders in 1812. The cathedral, which was finally consecrated in 1883, was destroyed just 48 years later at Stalin’s command. Plans for a Palace of Soviets, a museum and monument to Soviet might, were abandoned after steel from the cathedral’s scaffolding went toward the war effort and the site was found to be too marshy to support the construction. The remnants of the foundation became part of an open-air swimming pool, which opened in 1960 and closed in 1993.1 In 1994, as part of a project to restore buildings in Moscow’s center, Mayor Iurii Luzhkov announced that the cathedral would be rebuilt. Many Russians felt this space could reinvigorate the nation’s cultural and spiritual identity. The cathedral, consecrated in September 1997, is one of the most prominent features in the cityscape. It is laden with national symbolism, alluding to Russia’s imperial strength, Orthodoxy’s post-Soviet revival, the nation’s new epoch, and Moscow’s place in the country’s spiritual life. It also demonstrates the favor accorded to the Moscow Patriarchate by the various political actors involved in its reconstruction.

Luzhkov’s Cathedral

The state’s involvement in the project has been highly controversial, particularly Luzhkov’s role. Moscow’s mayor has enjoyed consistent popularity during his terms in office, despite allegations of questionable business practices and links to organized crime.2 He is a powerful political figure, renowned for his ambition and his ability to complete huge projects. According to Donald N. Jensen, an expert on the politics of Russian business, “The mayor has a reputation of getting things done – even to the smallest detail – never mind exactly how.”3 The cathedral is Luzhkov’s most conspicuous enterprise yet. It was perceived so much to be his pet project that it has been derisively referred to in a wordplay on the diminutive of Luzhkov as the “Cathedral of Luzhok the Savior.”4 The project secured him favor with Patriarch Aleksii II and with many (though by no means all) of the capital’s, if not the country’s, Orthodox believers. At the official opening in October 2000, Luzhkov stated that the cathedral “will help to regenerate Orthodoxy and spirituality in Russia.”5 Of greater personal significance to Luzhkov, perhaps, was the fact that the cathedral demonstrated Luzhkov’s own potency in the capital.

The Cost

The cost of the reconstruction remains controversial: the total is estimated to be between US $250 million and US $500 million. Critics of the project argued that this money was sorely needed elsewhere, such as in schools and hospitals, and not only in the capital, but throughout the entire country. Alfred Kokh, vice-chairman of the State Property Committee, asked, “How can you explain the fact that our so-called civilized country has a capital that spends more on building one church than on schools and hospitals?”6 Because much of the money came from the federal budget, the cost of the project fueled resentment of Moscow by those outside the relatively affluent Moscow region. Also, it was argued that if the money had been set aside for the reconstruction of historical monuments, it could have been used to restore hundreds, possibly thousands, of decaying Orthodox churches that are needed by parishioners across the country Fund Raising: By All Means

The source of funding is a further point of contention. While official Moscow Patriarchate sources claimed that 25 million citizens made donations toward the reconstruction, this cannot have amounted to a significant percentage of its cost.7 A large amount of money came from the federal budget. Some of it was derived from Luzhkov’s business connections. Jensen alleged that Luzhkov solicited contributions by granting favors to companies, including the state arms dealer, and by awarding businesses tax exemptions for donations. He noted that on the very same day that Stolichny Bank donated gold for the cupola, it was awarded the rights to manage the Patriarchate’s bank accounts.8 And, as a further incentive, donors had their names engraved on memorial plaques in the cathedral.

Other financial scandals include the US $11.8 million the government granted to the Moscow Patriarchate to buy a collection of icons for the cathedral. This contribution was kept secret until it aroused the interest of a Duma deputy, who demanded that the Patriarchate make public how this money was spent, and of Moscow News, which investigated how the Patriarchate spent taxpayers’ money.9 The scandal pointed to the Patriarchate’s lack of accountability, the clandestine nature of government contributions, and the lack of oversight over how public money was spent. In the cultural sphere, debate centered on the reconstruction’s artistic merit (or demerit).10

The Cathedral’s Multiple Meanings

The cathedral’s reconstruction had great significance for both the Moscow Patriarchate and then-President Boris Yeltsin’s administration. In official rhetoric, the cathedral symbolized the resurgence of Orthodoxy, the strength of the Church, and Russia’s anticipated moral and spiritual recovery. The Cathedral of Christ the Savior was regarded as cementing the presence of Russian Orthodoxy in the capital’s spiritual and cultural life. The conspicuousness of the reconstruction is a powerful symbol of the Church’s post-Soviet political presence and of politicians’ support for the Patriarchate.11 The speed of the reconstruction and its completion in time for Moscow’s 850th anniversary, despite its cost and considerable opposition, was a testimony to Luzhkov’s efficacy and power. It has endeared him and other politicians involved (particularly Yeltsin) to the Patriarchate. It was thus to the benefit of all figures concerned. But Leslie L. McGann has argued that Patriarch Aleksii, Mayor Luzhkov, and President Yeltsin “tarnished the spiritual symbol they had set out to create, erecting instead a symbol of Orthodoxy’s value, and Aleksii’s prowess, in the political sphere.”12 The reconstruction was recognition of the centrality of  Orthodoxy for Russia and for Russians, and the acknowledgement of this by the political actors involved. The various controversies associated with the project threatened to overshadow the importance of the cathedral to Russia’s cultural and religious recovery in the first post-Soviet decade. 

Notes:

1 See Andrew Gentes, “The Life, Death, and Resurrection of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, Moscow,” History Workshop Journal No. 46 (1998), 63-95, for an historical overview of the cathedral and the cathedral site.

2 Mikhail Gorshkov, “42 protsenta oproshennykh zhitelei Rossii sami gotovy lech’ na rel’sy,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 18 July 1998, 8.

3 Donald N. Jensen, “The Boss: How Yuri Luzhkov Runs Moscow,” Demokratizatsiya 8 (No. 1, 2000), Expanded Academic ASAP.

4 Mikhail Ivanov, “Faithful Reproduction,” Russian Life 43 (No. 4, 2000), 28.

5 Quoted in Elena Tsivileva, “Vosstanovlenie sviatyni zaversheno,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 6 October 2000, 2.

6 Quoted in Kristia Frilend, “Khram-Spasitelia stanovitsia simvolom rossiiskogo kapitalizma,” Finansovye izvestiia, 29 August 1995, 8.

7 Mikhail Ivanov, “1931: Razed and 2000: Raised,” Russian Life 43 (No. 4, 2000), 18.

8 Jensen, “The Boss,” 101.

9 Tatyana Andriasova, “Chernomyrdin’s Gift,” Moscow News, 3-9 September 1998, 4.

10 See Dmitrii Shimanskii, “Agressiia surrogata,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 31 December 1994, 13; Yelena Lebedeva, “Largest Construction Site of the Post-Soviet Era,” Moscow News, 1-7 August 1996, 15; and Ivanov, “Faithful Reproduction,” 23-26.

11 For further discussion of these points, see Dmitri Sidorov, “National Monumentalization and the Politics of Scale: The Resurrection of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 90 (No. 3, 2000), 548-72.

12 Leslie L. McGann, “The Russian Orthodox Church Under Patriarch Aleksii II and the Russian State: An Unholy Alliance?,” Demokratizatsiya 7 (No. 1, 1999), 20 Edited excerpt published with permission from Zoe Knox, Russian Society and the Orthodox Church; Religion in Russia after Communism (London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005). Published with permission of RoutledgeCurzon.

Zoe Knox is Lecturer in Russian and Eastern European History in the School of Historical Studies, University of Leicester, United Kingdom

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Volume 15, No. 1

Christian Mass Media in Russia: Under State Assault

Dmitry Vatulya

Religious mass media in Russia is very young – some 15 to 16 years. But in this early stage of its development, it faces extremely hard times from every possible direction. The cause of most of the trouble is state policy, especially in the area of electronic broadcasting. While Kremlin restrictions on print media are well-known, free, independent religious radio and TV stations are even more difficult to sustain. As program and on-site manager of a Christian satellite radio station for the past six years, I have had to face a variety of problems, all stemming from station relationships with government officials. Authorities do not want Christian, especially Protestant, channels, which the state considers suspect. Increasingly, the government sees Protestants as sectarian and a threat to state security.

Missed Opportunities

In the early 1990s most Protestants missed the opportunity to step through wide-open doors to religious broadcasting. Some of those who applied for licenses during that short period of time still exist. After that, especially under Putin, conditions have become much harder for Christian broadcasters. No more than a half dozen Christian radio stations exist in the huge land of Russia and not a single licensed Protestant TV channel. Those who do produce Christian television programs are either located outside Russia (for example, Channel New Life [CNL] that broadcasts from Kazakhstan via satellite), represent official Orthodox Church doctrine, or have small, unlicensed satellite operations that are hard for officials to trace (for example, TBN, the charismatic TV channel in St. Petersburg). Russia has only two Christian FM radio stations: New Life Radio in Magadan and MCC Radio in Vladikavkaz. The Magadan station struggled unsuccessfully to renew its license for over a year and is not currently broadcasting. Its future is unclear.

Some Christian programming is broadcast on middle wave range stations, but its poor audio quality attracts a small audience (mostly the elderly) and is not commercially viable. Many large Christian recording studios previously paid to place short programs of up to 30 minutes on secular radio stations. The gospel was even aired on federal government radio channels that reached into every Russian home (Radio Rossiya and Mayak), but between 2003 and 2006 managers of these government stations eliminated all Protestant programming by outright refusals or by pricing air time out of reach.

Official and Unofficial Obstacles

The Russian Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and freedom to proclaim religious beliefs. And, according to the law, the airwaves are open to every religious group. But reality is quite another story. All decisions to disallow religious broadcasting are unofficial, frequently by means of the licensing process. The authorities can and do make applications by religious groups nearly impossible. The number of documents required and the sums to be paid discourage many groups from even applying. The preparatory stage can take two to four years. Even if all necessary documents are obtained from all governmental offices, submitted applications may be subjected to endless delays. Officials may not respond for months. And when they do, the slightest mistake (real or imagined) is sufficient to require resubmission and further delays. Applicants will make the necessary corrections, apply again, and officials will identify new “mistakes,” such that the cycle can continue forever.

Another obstacle religious broadcasters face is competition for an official frequency awarded by the Federal Competition Committee of the Ministry of Culture. This body collects all applications for a particular frequency, sets the price based on its commercial value, and determines that all applicants have sufficient funds in their bank accounts. Then on a fixed date the committee hears oral presentations of no more than five minutes by each applicant explaining why a certain city needs this particular station. In the end, the committee never votes to license Christian broadcasters.

State Fears

The government does not want to give access to mass media to groups that can promote what it considers to be extreme religious ideas. The state guards itself. Even Orthodox broadcasters complain that the state limits their access to airwaves. Part of the state mentality derives from its Soviet heritage characterized by tremendous efforts and expenditures to block all shortwave religious broadcasting.

Money and Politics

People have high expectations these days. They want their food to be delicious and their clothes comfortable. They want their cars fast and silent. They watch DVD movies and listen to digital audio music soundtracks. Young people listen to FM radio, watch satellite TV, and depend on the Internet and cell phones. They want everything to be of the highest quality. If Christians want to reach this demanding audience, the church must develop FM and satellite radio and television which provide the best quality and the easiest access. Here Christian broadcasters face great resistance from the state, because FM radio is such a powerful way to influence people’s lives. The state’s interest is clear: it is commercial and political. The state is unlikely to permit religious broadcasting on FM frequencies because of their monitory value and because FM is such a powerful tool in swaying public opinion. Here politics reigns.

Official and Unofficial Obstacles

The Russian Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and freedom to proclaim religious beliefs. And, according to the law, the airwaves are open

Alternative Delivery

Despite the obstacles, ways can be found to use the modern technology of electronic broadcasting (radio, television, and the Internet) to reach millions of people.

Christian Mass Media

Christians just need to be creative and innovative. Alternative means of distribution do exist. Internet gives many options for distribution. Internet radio does not require a license, it is impossible to control, and broadcasting via the Internet can originate from any country in the world. Satellite distribution is another powerful alternative. A segment of satellite space can be rented and can be used to broadcast directly to homes that are beyond Russian state control. The number of homes equipped with satellite dishes and receivers is growing rapidly.

Centralized Christian broadcasting operations have an advantage in this environment. For instance, New Life Radio (NLR), with its main studio in Moscow, uplinks to a satellite from which many studios take its signal and distribute it in a variety of ways: some through local FM stations, some through a local Internet network, using a DSL Internet line and a small computer. New Life Radio is not even aware of all the means of distribution of its programs through Internet feeds. Listener responses to NLR programs come from diverse Russian-speaking territories: Novosibirsk, Norilsk, Karelia, Volgodonsk, and Yalta.

Even with state oppression, which grows ever stronger, a variety of creative ways still exist to proclaim the gospel using electronic mass media. Christians just need to be devout, optimistic, positive, and inventive. 

Dmitry Vatulya is station manager and program director for New Life Radio satellite operations, Moscow, Russia.