An Interview with Metropolitan Oleksandr (Drabinko) 

Metropolitan Oleksandr (Drabinko) of Pereiaslav-Khmelnytskyi and Vyshneve is one of two bishops in Ukraine who publicly supported autocephaly while under the Patriarch of Moscow; on 17 December he announced his transfer to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. From the Rivne Region in northwestern Ukraine, he was secretary to the late head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), Metropolitan Volodymyr (Sabodan), from 2006 until his death in 2014. Metropolitan Oleksandr is rector of the Transfiguration Cathedral in Teremki, Kyiv, in whose Metropolitan Volodymyr Museum he met with the editor of the East-West Church Report in early October. The original conversation took place in Russian.

As you know, a Greek Orthodox website recently issued a transcript of the 31 August meeting between Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople at the latter’s headquarters in Phanar, Istanbul. The transcript attributes the following words on Russia and Ukraine to Patriarch Kirill: “We have never stopped recognizing that we are one country and one people.” To what extent do the faithful of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) consider themselves to be part of the Russian lands or the Russian World?  

What can I say? We have a proverb for when someone moves from the countryside to the city and retains certain habits: “You can take the man out of the village, but you can’t take the village out of the man.” This is exactly how I evaluate the situation here. Patriarch Kirill no longer lives in the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union still lives in him, unfortunately. The imperialistic attitude remains. The Russian Church was always a stronghold of autocracy and suffered for it after 1917, when it was considered a pillar of the tsarist regime. Following on from the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Empire, the current president of Russia is now trying to recreate a Third Empire. And once again the Church is propping up this regime. But the Church is not of this world and should be above politics. It may be pleasant to receive preferences from the state now, but there will be a very bitter price to pay for all this in the end. 

I read those words of our patriarch with regret, because a person doesn’t say something like that on the spur of the moment, which means they must constantly think about us in such a way. It means that Russia, in the final instance, is not aware that Ukraine is a separate state in which the Ukrainian people live on their native land with their own language and faith, received by baptism in the year 988. 

But it was something else about those statements that bothered me most. Our warden here at the Transfiguration Cathedral has never been aggressively disposed towards Russia or the Russian Church, but when he heard those words he was outraged. He said, “I’m a patriot, I also love Russia and Kazakhstan”–he has relatives there–“so why am I, as a son of this land, considered a lesser person? It follows that my state is a lesser state, and my church is a lesser church.” And so with these words the patriarch pushed away reasonable people here, those who are neither Ukrainian nationalists nor strong Russophiles. 

It is clear from Metropolitan Onufry’s official statements that he fully accepts the legitimacy of the current Ukrainian government. Is this the case in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) generally?

Metropolitan Onufry says he accepts the legitimacy of the [Ukrainian] authorities, while Patriarch Kirill says in his statement [the 31 August transcript] that there was a сoup d’etat–you understand what spiritual schizophrenia we have ended up with here? The overall leader of the church says it is a coup, and locally they say it is not a coup. So what is the ordinary person supposed to think? Who is right, Metropolitan Onufry or Patriarch Kirill? Someone has to be lying.  

How do you view the prospect of autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church?

Autocephaly is not a new question. Independence, including church independence, is part of the mindset of the Ukrainian people. Throughout history the issue of church independence arose in tandem with that of the state. It was during the Hetmanate period of Cossack rule in the 17th century that the Orthodox hierarchy was restored following the Union with Rome in 1596. The movement for autocephaly appeared as soon as a Ukrainian state emerged in the early 20th century. When the Germans occupied Ukraine there was hope that they would allow the restoration of the Ukrainian state. Clearly, the fascists would never have allowed that–that is not what they came to do–but the autocephalous movement arose alongside this hope for an independent state in the 1940s and subsequently went into exile. When the Soviet Union collapsed the movement for autocephaly re-emerged, but Moscow never permitted it to develop further. In 1991 Filaret, then Metropolitan of Kyiv, wrote a letter to Moscow, also signed by the local Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, asking that we be granted full autocephaly. Moscow rejected it, and Filaret was punished for it. 

So the movement for an independent church is a natural process that is now finally acquiring visible forms, perhaps because the second Maidan, the Revolution of Gidnist’ [Ukrainian: Dignity] has taken place. De-Communization is underway here, finally.

How do you imagine a scenario of autocephaly in which Ukrainian Orthodox are kept together to the maximum extent? 

“All is flux, nothing stays still.” What we have today is only the beginning of the process. The ingredients are on the table, but what dish will be produced, and how that pie will bake, depends upon circumstances, the freshness of the ingredients, their proportions, the temperature of the oven. It is a process. 

Are there any formal reasons why the Ukrainian Orthodox Church may not be autocephalous? 

No, according to canon law it has absolutely all the prerequisites. Our church has its own territory, its own Orthodox people–a people who are believers, even according to statistics. We have enough dioceses, clergy, and seminaries for an independent existence. 

Did Patriarch Bartholomew’s actions this year to further Ukrainian autocephaly surprise you? 

Not particularly. The same situation arose with Poland in 1924 when Constantinople gave the right of autocephaly to the Polish Orthodox Church, which at that time was part of the Russian Church. You recall the conflict between Constantinople and Moscow over Estonia in 1996, and Constantinople’s recognition of Czech autocephaly in 1998. We also know that Stalin wanted to transfer the authority of the Ecumenical Patriarch to Moscow, and such aspirations have gained momentum in Putin’s Third Empire. It is my understanding that the last straw for Constantinople was when Moscow did not attend the Pan-Orthodox Council in Crete in 2016. 

However, I think the most important factor here is that the schism in Ukraine has gone on for 25 years, and Moscow–which in fact created it–has done nothing to heal it. This cannot continue. A whole generation has now grown up in schism–this does not accord with the Gospel, you will agree. To call your brothers schismatics, without grace, without valid sacraments… and what has Moscow done to make them valid? 

We must also recall that when the 1020th anniversary of the Baptism of Rus’ was celebrated here ten years ago, Patriarch Bartholomew visited Ukraine and there were discussions on this topic then. In 2009 His Beatitude Metropolitan Volodymyr [Sabodan] addressed representatives of the Local Churches at the Synaxis [gathering of hierarchs] in Constantinople and asked them to participate in discussions of this issue and its resolution. This should have been resolved back then, not now, when in practice it is being resolved unilaterally by Constantinople.  

Has there been any research into the likely response to autocephaly within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)?

When the question of autocephaly arose, Fr. Nikolai Danilevich, who heads our Department for External Church Relations, called it “a huge puff of air.” When the issue became more serious, Metropolitan Onufry spoke with President Petro Poroshenko but did not consult with the bishops. There has been no Bishops’ Council that might have taken a decision on this issue. The positions expressed on this issue came individually from Metropolitan Antoni (Pakanich), Fr. Nikolai Danilevich, and Metropolitan Mitrofan (Yurchuk), the head of our Department for External Church Relations. Positions expressing some degree of indignation–and even then only after Moscow has spoken–are adopted by the Synod. And what about the rest? We have not had any discussion of this issue. 

You must discuss it with various people within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). What do you believe to be the degree of support?

Seventy percent would like canonical autocephaly.  

Has the Ecumenical Patriarchate long known this?

Of course. If they didn’t know, they wouldn’t have undertaken to resolve this question. 

Has the shift in statistics following Maidan played a role here? Before 2014 more Ukrainian Orthodox told pollsters they belonged to the Moscow Patriarchate. After 2014 more began to say that they support the Kyiv Patriarchate.

It’s not quite like that. You understand that statistics are very deceptive, because everything depends upon how the question is phrased. You could ask the question, “Which do you support, the Moscow Church or the Kyiv Church?” “Of course we are for the Kyiv Church, the Ukrainian Church, our church!”

It is nominal believers who answer this way.

Yes, these are nominal people. But this is also evidence of patriotism, and suggests that, if there were a canonical Ukrainian Church not termed “Filaret’s” or “schismatic” in the questions, people would answer that they support and attend that Kyiv Church. 

Does the degree of support depend upon the region?

Yes, geographical differences are a factor. Western regions that were under Poland before 1939 were not so completely gutted by the Soviet regime. Eastern regions were under Soviet rule from the 1920s and whole villages died out in the famine, the Holodomor. The faith was gutted there, and pro-Russian influence has been very strong in eastern Ukraine; we cannot get away from this. Donetsk and Luhansk Regions were always categorically against autocephaly, along with Odessa. But western Ukraine preserved its character, its desire for independence. 

Does that mean that opposition to autocephaly will be marginal?

Not geographically. Everywhere there will be people who want to remain in the Russian Church. To begin with, there will be a very large percentage, up to 40 percent. In different places it will vary, but 30-40 percent will wish to remain subject to the Russian Church. They will be like ROCOR [the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia], the Russian Church in Ukraine. 

That’s how they will be called? 

Well, there will probably be re-registration. 

Is there also a big difference in views between the generations? 

Yes. We should not forget that over the past 25 years a whole generation has matured who studied in Ukrainian schools, who grew up with different rhetoric, who have a different interpretation of history, who have been raised in their own state, without the migratory movement of the Soviet period, when military families moved across the Union. Our soldiers are now in their home state. 

The war [in the Donbass] has also left a very strong mark. We are called brother nations, but what if our brothers kill us? How do we prove that we are brother nations to the village grandmother who has to tend the grave of her son? And it is not just one grandmother. It is thousands of families. Will they call the Russians brothers? No. This generation has grown up with a different understanding of Russia and the processes that are taking place, and it is rather harsh. 

Why do you think strong opposition to autocephaly nevertheless exists within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)? 

A representative of Phanar, Metropolitan Elpidophoros (Lambriniadis), once remarked to me that we Ukrainians are an unfathomable people. “You strive for autocephaly for centuries,” he said, “and when it is handed to you, you don’t want to take it!” I replied that there is also a lot that I do not understand. What is happening within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is absolute nonsense. I understand Moscow and the Kremlin–they don’t want to lose Ukraine because it gives status in the Orthodox world. After all, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is 12,000 parishes: “If these 12,000 leave, who are we then?” On the geopolitical side, the Russian Orthodox Church also trades on its image when dealing with the Kremlin: “The Soviet Union fell apart, only the Church remains.” And this is a sphere of influence for Russia–if not politically, there remained a single Church as an inalienable part of the Russian World. But it burst like a soap bubble. That theory, as Fr. Nikolai said, turned out to be a huge puff of air! (Laughs.) 

Might opponents of autocephaly see distant authority in Moscow as defense from a local despot? 

It is true that we are independent in our administration. But it must not be forgotten that this is an internal status. We have rights of broad autonomy, but we don’t have the broadest autonomy. We have the rights of a citizen, but we are not citizens. At any moment we could be told, “Sorry, your authorization has expired, we cannot give you these rights any longer, we are rescinding them, so please return to the status of an Exarchate” or something else. 

There is nothing to be afraid of in obtaining independence. “We are satisfied with the current situation,” the Ukrainian Orthodox Church says. But in that case, why would you not be satisfied with being independent? If we have full independence, in what way would that be unsatisfactory? 

From the viewpoint of Moscow, would there be any financial losses involved?  

No financial losses would be involved. The only thing that might be considered an economic factor is Sofrino, the company near Moscow that has long been the major producer of liturgical and other Orthodox goods in the post-Soviet region. But other, smaller factories have now appeared; we have some companies in Vinnytsia, Lutsk, and Kharkiv that meet our requirements. 

What about the legal situation? According to church statutes, do church buildings–if they are not historical monuments–belong to the parish, the diocese, or the whole Church? 

Everything depends upon how the documentation is drawn up. They could belong to the parish community or to the diocese or be in private ownership, but not to the whole church. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church as a whole is not a legal entity. 

But whatever happens, property ownership remains within Ukraine? Moscow cannot claim anything? 

No, no. There can be no claims to property, or land, or anything else.