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Volume 19, No 2

We’d Better Give Up Tolerance

We’d better give up tolerance, a well-known religious expert believes. Roman Silantyev, head of the Center for Geography of Religions at the [Moscow Patriarchate] Synodal Department for Church and Society Relations, urged the public to give up the term tolerance.

“Tolerance is the term which recently society has been trying to fill with a new sense of meaning; but the word failed to comply with expectations in the sense of tolerance to evil and destructive pacifism,” he said in Cheboksary at a round table conference, “Tolerance as Imperative in Dialogue of Civilizations, Cultures, and Confessions.”

Silantyev said he visited a youth camp in September 2010 where a lecture on tolerance was delivered. Participants “trained to use the Internet” told him that they had looked up the word tolerance and found that it was a medical term meaning a diminution in the physiological response to disease. Thus, “the most tolerant of us is an AIDS patient who has no immunity to anything at all.”

“Tolerance has a Western origin and is a great step forward compared with racial theories, concentration camps, and apartheid, but compared with peace among peoples inherent to Russia it is a step backward,” Silantyev believes. According to him, “Europeans have no reason to teach us tolerance. Moreover, we should teach them the right patterns of peace among peoples and religions.

“The propaganda of tolerance seems irrelevant while the Western tolerant and multicultural society is in collapse, and even European leaders refer to the failure of this model,” he noted. Silantyev urged the public to give up this term “as there is no practical benefit in its use.” F

Source: Interfax (http:www.interfax-religion.com), 23 November 2010. Reprinted with permission.

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Volume 19, No 2

Book Review

Bruce R. Berglund and Brian Porter-Sucz, eds. Christianity and Modernity in Eastern Europe. Budapest-New York: Central European University Press, 2010. Reviewed by Paul Mojzes

The satisfaction of reading some books would be better if the introductory claims made for them were more temperate. Pages one to three of this edited volume reflect a degree of dismissiveness of earlier historical studies of religion in Eastern Europe, but it is unclear who is being criticized: earlier studies undertaken under dramatically different circumstances or academics from other disciplines who are unappreciative of historians? Here works by Robert Tobias, Trevor Beeson, Stella Alexander, Thomas Bremer, and many others are not mentioned. Only Bohdan Bociurkiw’s studies of Ukraine are acknowledged.

References to this volume’s alleged greater sophistication and major advances in the study of Eastern Europe sound like self-serving marketing claims. Porter-Sucz speaks of the need to deconstruct the word “religion” as an inappropriate academic abstraction (10-11), but he and other authors in the volume proceed to use the term (23). No similar critique is made of modernity, which some authors seem to equate with secularism, while others mean by it post-Reformation and post-Enlightenment developments. And, despite claims of a strong unifying theme, this book, based on two conferences for the contributors and others in Grand Rapids, Michigan, and Warsaw, Poland, encompasses topics so diverse that it is difficult to discern the encounter of East European Christians with modernity uniting the various chapters.

As in most symposia, individual contributions vary in quality. Paul Hanebrink very helpfully traces the attempted synthesis of Christianity and nation in Hungary between the two world wars, resulting in a sharp right-wing tilt by many major players. This chapter helps set the stage for the trauma of Hungarian churches under Communism resulting in categorical non-cooperation by some church leaders and collaboration by others.

Martin Putna’s “The Search for a ‘Fourth Path’: Czech Catholicism between Liberalism, Communism, and Nazism” is somewhat mistitled because the author only investigates several Catholic literary figures who were not necessarily representative either of the clerical leadership or Czech Catholic laity. His findings cannot be automatically extended to the entire Church, though some insights surely apply to a wider circle.

The equation Polak-Catholic is inaccurate on many counts according to James Bjork. Rather than uniformity within a Polish Catholic bulwark, he finds a patchwork of major regional differences as regards the degree of Catholic Church influence. Apparently to the present day the Prussian-Russian-Austrian partitions of Poland left lasting but varying imprints on the degree of Polish attachment to Catholicism. The level of devotion to Catholicism varies across Poland from a degree vastly exceeding that of Western Europe in some regions to, in other parts of Poland, a much lower degree compared to most of Western Europe James Ramon Felak researched the Catholic dilemma in Slovakia between 1945 and 1948. Because of the disastrous pro-Nazi stance of the anti-semitic Monsignor Jozef Tiso, ascendant Communists in postwar Slovakia considered Catholics politically unreliable. Many Catholics supported the Communists, others attempted to create Catholic political parties, but the majority, including the bishops, supported the Protestant-oriented Democratic Party. Of course, these multiparty efforts all came to naught after the 1948 Communist coup de etat.

The fate of Ukrainian Greek (Byzantine) Catholics forcibly “re-united” with the Russian Orthodox Church is well known. Natalia Shlikta provides a very competent and nuanced treatment of the various responses and interpretations of the meaning of this act among Western Ukrainian Christians, the Soviet government, Ukrainian and local officials, and Russian Orthodox hierarchs. While some West Ukrainians accepted this homecoming to Orthodoxy, others could barely wait for perestroika and the fall of Communism to reestablish their Church.

Those interested in theological reflections on human rights will appreciate Katharina Kunter’s study of the different ways in which East German and Czech Protestant theologians defined priorities in human rights. Kunter seems to think that Czechs, who generated the pro-democracy Charter 77 Movement, more readily defended individual expressions of human rights while some East German theologians favored collective human rights, which were typically touted by Communist apologists.

Patrick Hyder Patterson authored the sole chapter dealing with Christian-Muslim relations. In one of the volume’s most thought-provoking chapters, Patterson notes that East Europeans have had a longer historical experience with Islam than West Europeans. In addition, he highlights the diversity of European responses ranging from alarmist and confrontational to the idea of a Christian-Muslim united front against secularism.

Space does not permit mention of every chapter in this interesting compilation. The authors make fairly frequent references to one another’s work, as does Bruce Berglund in the concluding chapter, which maps out an historical/religious geography of Eastern Europe. Berglund’s discussion of East European contributions to a united Europe is helpful, although those of us who hail from Eastern Europe find the obligation to defend the region’s European bona fides tiresome.

Usually endnotes are considered marginal, but the very voluminous documentation of this volume is a real treasure of information that constitutes an integral part of the work. My judgment is that this book is likely to be more useful to academia than to the church. F

Paul Mojzes is professor of religion at Rosemont College, Rosemont, Pennsylvania, and co-editor of the journal Religion in Eastern Europe.

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Volume 19, No 2

Self-Reliance Versus Interdependence

Another recurring cross-cultural conflict repeatedly raised among Americans concerns Romanians “always borrowing things.” For Americans, while friends are expected to help one another on occasion, too many requests by one party may threaten the relationship. This attitude is confusing to Romanians who come from a culture stressing closely knit friendships involving economic and social interdependence.2 By way of contrast, for Americans, the goal of self-reliance is paramount for success in life.3 Even being completely aware of this cultural difference does not remove the emotions Americans feel when they think they are “being taken advantage of” and their friendship is being abused.

Based on the strong American concept of private ownership, missionaries often refuse to let nationals use their material possessions freely and thus are considered stingy. Sherwood Lingenfelter points out that the anxiety among American missionaries about personal (or church) property is one of the key obstacles to reaching other cultures. This behavior is often justified based on the biblical principle of stewardship, whereas the American passion for private ownership may actually be the driving force in decisions about the husbanding or sharing of material possessions.4

Because of the income disparity, Romanian Evangelicals believe American Evangelicals should give generously to their poorer brothers in Christ. Americans, who are very sensitive to the concepts of self-reliance and good stewardship, are generally offended, and they do not like feeling pressured into giving.5 Because Americans place such a high value on gratitude and appreciation, they consider the relative lack of voiced gratitude in Romanian culture to be morally lacking, unfortunately, all the more reason to not want to give. Americans pride themselves on being generous but have the fault of liking to be known and appreciated for it.

Contrasting Concepts of Personal Space and Deportment

Romanians and Americans also have differing concepts of personal space. Physical touching, close body proximity, generous use of gestures, and speaking in a loud voice characterize southern Europeans. In contrast, North Americans typically keep their distance. In personal conversation, Romanians place themselves closer to each other than Americans find comfortable. Conversely, Romanians interpret the distance Americans attempt to maintain as a sign of reluctance to form close personal bonds.6

Americans and Romanians also have differing concepts of modesty. Members of one conservative American evangelical missionary family admonished a female Romanian language teacher for wearing pants because they considered such attire to be immodest. For her part the Romanian teacher considered this missionary family to be immodest because it lived in a fancy rented home and drove a new car. Simply put, different cultures have different understandings of modesty. In many conservative Romanian churches, personal distance between the sexes is maintained rigorously. Men often sit on one side of the sanctuary and women on the other. Personal touching is frowned upon. Men and women do not touch in any way whatsoever in church. For Americans who are very informal and often touch freely, this difference can cause great misunderstanding and conflict. What is considered an innocent gesture by Americans can be misunderstood and can lead to gossip. Hugging, which is common in American culture, is fraught with danger because it is a very rare public expression in Romania.

Ethnocentrism

From a missiological perspective, even a simple awareness of differences can potentially help missionaries avoid unnecessary conflicts. Many Americans are not aware of their unique cultural perspectives. Similarly, American Evangelicals tend to assume their values are biblical and universal rather than culturally conditioned. If Americans and Romanians could view each other’s cultures as mutually valid, but with different means of explaining reality, then many of the cross-cultural conflicts that occur could be avoided. Ethnocentrism, however, can destroy that possibility. As guests in Romanian culture, the onus is on American evangelical missionaries to cross the cultural bridge.

Too often American evangelical missionaries working in Romania have been, to use Romanian Evangelicals’ own words, “grossly ignorant” of the cultural differences between themselves and those with whom they work. Some missionaries surveyed considered simply learning the language to be enough, although not all even bothered with that crucial task. Some were totally unaware of fundamental value differences. Other missionaries who were aware of the differences concluded that Romanian values were morally wrong. Obviously, simple awareness of differences is not enough.

Often Americans are also—as I suspect all peoples are—unaware of their own ethnocentrism. Three specific results are an attitude of cultural pride, a propensity toward cultural bias and insensitivity, and perhaps most insidious, a belief in one’s superiority. These three results of ethnocentrism were observed in survey responses regarding what Romanians especially disliked about American missionaries: their “arrogance,” “pride,” and “superior attitude.” Ethnocentrism is clearly a very grave problem for American evangelical missionaries working in Romania. If Romanians’ overwhelming impression of American missionaries is that of pride, arrogance, and a condescending attitude, what are their chances of actually being a help to the Romanian evangelical church, or of having meaningful relationships with Romanians in general?

Ideally it would be helpful if Romanians working with missionaries would meet them halfway across the cultural bridge. But as a practical matter, missionaries must be willing to travel all the way across the cultural bridge whether or not Romanians care to or are able to do so. Standing in the middle hoping Romanians will come halfway across may be pointless. Ultimately, missionaries are called to live cross-culturally, not those they hope to reach. F

Notes:

1Edward C. Stewart and Milton J. Bennett, American Cultural Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective, rev. ed. (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1972), 56.

2Paul G. Hiebert, Cultural Anthropology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1983), 248.

3S. A. Grunlan and M.K. Mayers, Cultural Anthropology: A Christian Perspective (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1988), 211; Sherwood Lingenfelter, Transforming Culture: A Challenge for Christian Mission (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1998), 24; Sherwood Lingenfelter, Agents of Transformation: A Guide for Effective Cross-Cultural Ministry (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1996), 198; Serena Nanda, Cultural

Eugene A. Nida, Customs and Cultures: Anthropology for Christian Missions (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), 247.

4Lingenfelter, Transforming Culture, 51-53.

5Ibid., Chapter 5; Lingenfelter, Agents of Transformation, 87, 92, 242-46.

6Edward T. Hall, The Silent Language (Greenwich, CT: Fawcett, 1959); Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966); David J. Hesselgrave, ed., Theology and Mission: Papers Given at Trinity Consultation No. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1978), 299, 301-06; Hiebert, Anthropological Insights, 96; Hiebert, Cultural Anthropology, 35; Mark L. Knapp, Nonverbal Communication in Human Interaction (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972); Lingenfelter, Agents of Transformation, 36; Nanda, Cultural Anthropology, 86; Ruth S. Freed, “Space, Density, and Cultural Conditioning,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 285 (1977), 593-604.

Edited excerpts published with permission from Andrew LaBreche, “Ethnocentrism. U.S.—American Evangelical Missionaries in Romania: Qualitative Missiological Research into Representative Cross-Cultural Value Based Conflicts,” Ph.D. dissertation, Evangelical Theological Faculty of Leuven, Belgium, 2007.

Andrew LaBreche is an American missionary who has served with Greater Europe Mission in Romania since 1996.

Editor’s note: The final portion of this article will be published in the next issue of the East-West Church and Ministry Report 19 (Summer 2011)

 Reprinted with permission from Todd M. Johnson and Kenneth R. Ross, Atlas of Global Christianity (Edinburg, Scotland: Edinburg University Press, 2009), 275.

Editor’s Note: Four previous issues of the East-West Church and Ministry Report have included missionary statistics; 2 (Winter 1994), 5; 3 (Spring 1995), 10; 5 (Spring 1997), 10; 10 (Winter 2002), 15. With growing restrictions on missionary service in many post-Soviet states, ministries have become more reticent to share data with the East-West Church and Ministry Report, making it harder to calculate the size of the missionary force. Nevertheless, based on conversations and correspondence with mission personnel, it would appear that some of the missionary estimates in the Atlas of Global Christianity for post-Soviet states are high. For example, the East-West Church and Ministry Report 5 (Spring 1997), 10, gave a figure of 5,606 Protestant missionaries working in the former Soviet Union in 1996. Despite abundant anecdotal evidence of retrenchment in the past 15 years, the Atlas still reports 20,000 missionaries in the Russian Republic alone in 2010. Similarly, it seems questionable that the number of missionaries serving in Romania has grown from 453 in 2001, the figure published in the East-West Church and Ministry Report 10 (Winter 2002), 15, to 1,200 in 2010.

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Volume 19, No 2

International Religious Freedom Advocacy

H. Knox Thames, Chris Seiple, and Amy Rowe

Around the world, persons of faith continue to face serious obstacles to the full and free enjoyment of religious freedom. Some authorities estimate that more than half of the world’s population cannot fully enjoy this cherished fundamental freedom. At the same time, religious freedom protections are well established in international law which recognizes it as a universal human right. Of course, despite states pledging to uphold and defend these norms through treaties and international agreements, implementation is inconsistent, even among European countries.

Advocacy 101

By pressing for governmental compliance, religious freedom advocacy saves lives, frees prisoners, and increases religious liberties. Within the international system, religious freedom advocates push for change by conducting direct advocacy, meeting with governmental and international policymakers, publicizing abuses, reporting on compliance to monitoring bodies, and using international complaint mechanisms. To be effective, advocates generally undertake these activities by joining or working with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) committed to religious freedom. Advocates should concentrate on engaging international institutions and mobilizing their political leverage toward a government that is violating religious freedom. NGOs often act as the vital catalyst and go-between.

It is important for religious freedom advocacy groups to speak out against all forms of religious persecution and repression, even if their coreligionists are not affected or persons of no faith are targeted. Strength resides in numbers, and often a positive conclusion in one case will be useful to others in similar situations. Governments try to “buy” the silence of groups by providing benefits or freedoms exclusive to their communities. Advocates should avoid this temptation.

Advocates must also be very careful about the facts. If they are found to exaggerate or misrepresent, or to be ill-informed, then they will have a difficult time persuading persons of power and influence. One key issue is the use of vocabulary. Sometimes, in an attempt to induce a faster international response, advocates are tempted to exaggerate to make a situation sound more compelling. For instance, the word persecution is often carelessly thrown around without any thought as to its true meaning. This overuse only cheapens the term and lessens the impact when describing an actual situation of persecution, hindering an advocate’s effectiveness. It is an issue of trust. Once policymakers and monitoring bodies become aware of the loose usage of terminology, they will be much more difficult to persuade and motivate to action.

The Development of Human Rights

Originally, international law was about relations between states whose rights trumped individual rights. Thus within its borders a state could act as it wished and be immune from outside pressures. However, as the international system matured and developed from the 1700s to the 1900s, states gradually recognized individual rights. The major transition from the state-centric focus to a more individualistic approach came after the atrocities of World War II and the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi war criminals. Establishment of the United Nations (UN) provided the architecture for a human rights system protecting an array of individual rights, including religious freedom.

Religious freedom is protected through a variety of international agreements and human rights treaties, which recognize personal freedoms and limit the actions of governments. These protections come in a variety of forms, with the most common being a treaty. Human rights treaties usually create individual rights and state obligations, and are sometimes called covenants, conventions, or charters. A treaty can be amended through a protocol, which often adds additional rights or introduces new mechanisms to enforce the treaty. In addition to the United Nations, groups of countries have developed regional organizations, similar in structure to the United Nations but limited in geographical scope.

The International Religious Freedom Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1998, provides a useful explanation of what can constitute a violation of religious freedom in Section 3(13)(A): arbitrary prohibitions on, restrictions of, or punishment for 1) assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, including arbitrary registration requirements; 2) speaking freely about one’s religious beliefs; 3) changing one’s religious beliefs and affiliation; 4) possessing and distributing religious literature, including Bibles; and 5) raising one’s children in the religious teachings and practices of one’s choice. Examples of infringements on religious liberty include stringent registration requirements, favoring particular religious expressions, arbitrary thresholds, free speech limitations, and misuse of national security concerns.

Registration Schemes—Too Much Information

Registration schemes that fall outside of international standards seek to control rather than facilitate the enjoyment of religious freedom for all. In many countries, registration with the government is required for a group to practice “legally” or to enjoy a corporate status. Often, these systems require special governmental bodies to review doctrines. This is problematic because it places the state in the inappropriate position of determining what constitutes a religion, and it can lead to discrimination against new or minority religious communities.

Tiers—Some Are More Equal Than Others

Problematic religion laws often establish de facto, if not de jure, tiers for religious communities. In these systems, tiers can take the form of different levels of religious community status. They can also come in the form of recognizing one or a few religious groups as “traditional,” thereby discriminating against all other groups and placing them in a permanent second-class status. Usually favored status comes with benefits: state funding, avoidance of registration, and tax breaks.

Thresholds—The Numbers Game

Thresholds often accompany tiered systems and utilize numerical criteria for placing groups on different levels. In these situations, religion laws require congregations to have a certain number of adult members. If this number is below 100, the requirement is generally viewed as benign. However, if it reaches into the thousands, then the threshold is discriminatory. Laws can also establish time-framed restrictions, requiring religious groups to operate in the country for a certain period of time before qualifying for registration or a higher level of recognition. These schemes prevent minority religious communities from enjoying the same status as traditional groups and from having access to certain legal protections and benefits.

Free Speech Limitations—The Gag Rule

An increasing number of countries have placed limitations on free speech, regulating public sharing of religious belief that intends to persuade the listener to another point of view. States increasingly use the concept of “proper” and “improper” proselytism: It is deemed improper if individuals are pressured to convert or monetary or material gain is offered to induce conversion.

National Security—False Justification

Many times, governments cite national security as a reason to limit religious freedom. International agreements protecting religious freedom do not recognize national security as a permissible justification to limit religious manifestations, but only “public safety, order, health, [and] morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”—ICCPR art.18 (3). Jurists have also firmly established that this is a narrow list of limitations, for employment only in rare occasions.

The United Nations

Created out of the ashes of World War II and the Holocaust, the United Nations is the world’s preeminent international organization. While often criticized for its bureaucracy and slow response, the UN performs many positive functions. Its 1948 founding charter declares one of its primary goals to be the promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. This simple but momentous reference for the first time recognized world consensus that human rights were of global concern. Building on this recognition, subsequent UN conventions and covenants have enumerated these rights and concretely established religious freedom as a fundamental freedom.

UN religious freedom commitments are found in the so-called “International Bill of Rights,” comprised of three documents—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. In 1948 the UN General Assembly approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights without any objections. This foundation document of the international human rights system was drafted under the supervision of Eleanor Roosevelt as Chair of the Commission on Human Rights. It was the first attempt by the world community to codify human rights standards.

While General Assembly resolutions are nonbinding, the Universal Declaration is viewed as a “common standard of achievement” against which to measure government actions. Several provisions of the Universal Declaration are not recognized as universal rights by many countries, such as the right to work or to leisure. However, Article 18 on religious freedom is widely supported. Article 18 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights speaks directly to religious freedom. It recognizes that “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship, and observance” (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR). Other parts of the Universal Declaration speak to religious freedom. Article 2(1) condemns religiously based discrimination that would limit the enjoyment of these rights while Article 19 protects all forms of speech, including religious expression.

The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, focusing on political rights, provides a more elaborate enunciation of the right to religious freedom than the UDHR. Since it is a treaty, its provisions are also legally binding, unlike the declaratory UDHR. Article 18 of the ICCPR that deals directly with religious freedom requires governments to recognize the right of individuals to freely follow the religion of their choice and declares that no one may be coerced into joining a religion.

The Human Rights Committee, established by ICCPR Article 28, is the primary treaty-based body of concern to religious freedom advocates. Its role is to monitor the implementation of the ICCPR (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/hrc.htm). The committee was given a complaint recourse mechanism through the approval of the First Optional Protocol to the Covenant in 1976. Expanding the committee’s role significantly, the Protocol empowered the committee to receive communications from individuals from those countries ratifying the Protocol who assert a violation of their ICCPR rights. Countries may also file complaints against other state parties. One hundred and five countries have now ratified the First Optional Protocol. Human Rights Committee decisions are nonbinding, but they nonetheless provide a high-profile, public venue to raise concerns. Any committee ruling against a state places increased international pressure on a government to reform its policies and practices.

The European Union

The European Union (EU) is a supranational and intergovernmental organization bringing together 27 member countries from across Europe. With over 500 million citizens living across roughly 1.6 million square miles and speaking 23 languages, the European Union is becoming more and more of an international force. Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, the EU is built around the principles of human rights, democracy, and rule of law.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights outlines the political rights of all EU citizens. Article 10 parallels what is found in the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant, while also expressly providing for the right to change one’s religion. The Charter’s status is unique, as it is not considered a treaty or legally binding document, but rather a proclamation of human rights that all EU member states should uphold. Until all 27 states agree on the form of the European Constitution, the Charter will remain an important nonbinding agreement on states that reflect European standards on human rights and religious freedom.

The Council of Europe

The Council of Europe (CoE) is the oldest regional organization in Europe, established in 1949 by the Treaty of London with ten founding members. Open to all European democracies, the CoE expanded significantly after the end of the Cold War, and its membership overlaps with both the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CoE now stretches into Eastern Europe and beyond, with members including the Russian Federation, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Today, the number of participating countries totals 47.

Headquartered in Strasbourg, France, the purpose of the CoE is to promote human rights, democratization, and rule of law in all member countries. Considering the wide array of countries and traditions brought into the CoE after the post-Communist expansion, the CoE focuses heavily on ensuring that all members uphold their legally binding commitments to human rights and democratization. The CoE has several important bodies with concerns for religious freedom including the European Court of Human Rights.

The essential document for the Council of Europe is the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, also known as the European Convention on Human Rights, which was adopted in 1950 and entered into force in 1953. Acceptance has become a prerequisite for applicant countries wishing to join the CoE. Predating the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention represented the first attempt to make legally binding the rights highlighted in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 9 of the Convention protects the religious freedom of individuals residing in CoE countries. Following a similar formula to the UDHR, it specifically recognizes the freedom of the individual to “change his religion or belief.” Many additional protocols have been added to the Convention to expand its scope on a variety of issues. However, the greatest developments (especially for religious freedom) have come through the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights, which was established by the European Convention (http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/).

The European Court represents the most advanced and developed international human rights judicial system in the world, as 47 Council of Europe members have submitted themselves to the Court’s jurisdiction. The number of cases sent to the court is very large and increases each year. In 1981, roughly 400 applications were filed, whereas in 2001 close to 14,000 were submitted. The Court is therefore extremely active, hearing a wide range of cases based on the various articles of the European Convention for Human Rights. In its various rulings, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is one of the foundations of a democratic society and must be protected. F

Editor’s note: The second half of this article will be published in the next issue of the East-West Church and Ministry Report 19 (Summer 2011).

Edited excerpts reprinted with permission from H. Knox Thames, Chris Seiple, and Amy Rowe, International Religious Freedom Advocacy; A Guide to Organizations, Law, and NGOs (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2009).

H. Knox Thames is Director of Policy and Research for the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Washington, DC. Chris Seiple is President of the Institute for Global Engagement, Arlington, Virginia.

Amy Rowe served as Director of Country Programs at the Institute for Global Engagement, Arlington, Virginia, until 2007.