JAAKKO LEHTOVIRTA

The Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople granted independent status to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine on 6 January 2019. The following day—Orthodox Christmas—the news on Russia’s state-controlled Channel One allotted special attention to this development.1 The report was revealing. The news presenter stressed that the tomos—the Ecumenical Patriarch’s document awarding autocephalous (independent) status—came from Istanbul. The audience was led to think that the Ecumenical Patriarch’s residency in Istanbul means “foreign” control over the Ukrainian Church. Yet the Russian Patriarch’s residency in Moscow does not? Such a mental construct is only possible if Russia and Ukraine are not seen as separate countries. 

This is, in fact, the Russian position. Putin has famously said that Russians and Ukrainians are one people.2 The view of the Russian Orthodox Church is not much different. The Church has occasionally shown limited independence in the political sphere, as when it did not entirely back Russian government action against Georgia, another historically Orthodox country, in 2008.3 But since then the Church has increasingly become a government instrument in the promotion of Great Russian nationalism, a role also performed by the Orthodox Church in Imperial Russia. Today, the policy concept promoted in the immediate neighborhood is that of the “Russian World” [Russian: Russky mir]. 

The elusive Russian World extends beyond the territory of the Russian Federation, and Ukraine and Belarus are counted as self-evident parts. These three nations are seen as tracing their origins back to a single proto-state, Rus’, which flourished a thousand years ago.4 Crucially, this history is fused with the formation of Christian identity, and reflected in the long title of the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, “Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus’.” 

As Russia’s current rulers seek to monopolize the territory that was ancient Rus’, the Moscow Patriarchate’s sway over it helps to substantiate the view that—although Ukraine and Belarus gained independence simultaneously with Russia when the Soviet Union collapsed—they are not truly sovereign foreign countries. They are, and must remain, dependencies of Moscow. If the Russian Church loses its position in Ukraine, a key element of the Russian World disappears. 

If we are to believe a leaked transcript of his August, 2018, discussions with Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople, Patriarch Kirill—like Putin— does not really consider Ukraine a separate nation.5 In Ukraine, Metropolitan Onufry— head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Moscow—has tried to walk a finer line. He has appealed to Putin to preserve Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and expressed his firm support for “all peace initiatives of the Ukrainian authorities.”6 Still, this does not quite amount to support for national efforts to defend Ukraine with armed force. 

Given Moscow’s efforts to belittle and undermine Ukraine’s independence, Onufry’s position is no longer enough for Kyiv. Growing suspicion that some Moscow-loyal prelates are aiding separatist forces now means that Church affairs cannot remain outside politics.7 Putin is right when he describes the new Ukrainian Church as a political project; it is a response to his own.8 President Poroshenko of Ukraine on 15 December described the new Constantinople-loyal body as a “Church without Putin” and “without prayers for the Russian authorities and Russian troops, because they kill Ukrainians.”9

Parishioners, not patriarchs 

This is not the proper place to argue whether events have moved in a correct way from a canonical point of view. Not everyone feels that they have. There will never be an absolute and objective answer to this, due to the complexities of Eastern Orthodoxy. Constantinople and Moscow, the senior and the largest of the Patriarchates respectively, have never agreed upon certain ecclesiastical rules: Who has authority to award autocephaly and so create a new local Orthodox Church? How should ecclesiastical boundaries between local Orthodox Churches be decided? 

The international community should follow these developments closely, as they have potential for far-reaching social and political fallout. Within Ukraine, the key factor to watch is how ordinary Ukrainians now act. To date, there have been reports of relatively small-scale movement to the new Church—the transfer of some 300 parishes from the Moscow Patriarchate’s 12,000 in Ukraine, largely in the Ukrainianspeaking northwest.10 However, are we talking of potentially New schism? By attacking the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople’s interpretation of significant numbers. 

It may be naïve to expect ordinary parishioners to show their colors very quickly. The situation on the ground may remain unclear for quite some time. After all, many Ukrainians seem to go to their nearest Orthodox church without much thought of its affiliation in the wider context. Maybe they will become more conscious now; the appearance and formal recognition of the new Church makes for a clear-cut choice. The stigma of complete non-recognition has been removed with the tomos, while the political stigma of siding with the Russia-backed Church—seen as supporting the adversaries of the Ukrainian state—is growing. 

And maybe these parishioners will not be given the luxury of neutrality amidst the clash of the Orthodox Titans.

New schism? 

By attacking the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople’s interpretation of the canons, Moscow goes against a mighty and experienced adversary. Yet, preeminent as the Ecumenical Patriarch may be, he is not an eastern Pope. He cannot command other independent Orthodox church leaders. 

One of the first reactions from Moscow to the appearance of the new Church in Ukraine was to claim that Constantinople’s action creates a new schism along the lines of the one that divided Western and Eastern Christianity in the year 1054. This comparison appears exaggerated, as there is no theological dispute involved this time. But a split there is, and it may widen, not least because Moscow has cut ecclesiastical ties with Constantinople. The Moscow Patriarchate is now mustering ranks to support its call of foul play in the establishment of the Ukrainian Church, and not unsuccessfully. 

So far, the heaviest-weight backer of Moscow has predictably been Irinej, Patriarch of Serbia. In his Christmas message, he proclaimed that in Ukraine, “passion filled chauvinistRussophobes … [have] deepened and spread the existing schism and seriously jeopardized the unity of Orthodoxy.”11 In the background here is not just centuries of Russo-Serbian fraternity and Russia’s support against the independence of Kosovo, but also fear of newly independent Montenegro and North Macedonia seeking autocephaly for their Orthodox Churches with the support of Constantinople. Patriarch John of Antioch—one of the four senior-most Patriarchates—has also criticized the Ecumenical Patriarch’s action.12 Residing in Syria, whose government is propped up by Russia, his hands may be tied. Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk, head of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations, has met with Patriarch Theophilos III of Jerusalem, but it seems this meeting did not produce the outcome that Moscow wished.13

In January Metropolitan Sawa of All Poland rejected the consecration of the newly created Metropolitan Epifany of Kyiv, referring to him as a layman.14 Other Orthodox Churches—including Georgia15— have expressed an intention to stay out of the quarrel, but sooner or later they at least will have to decide if they will commemorate Metropolitan Epifany during services. 

A permanent split among the Orthodox Churches is not inevitable, however. After all, what is happening in Ukraine follows the lines of earlier developments in newly independent Finland and Estonia. Moscow disputes the autonomy of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church, granted by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1923 and restored in 1996. In Finland, the local Orthodox Church was also granted autonomy by the Ecumenical Patriarch in 1923, and this status was recognized by the Moscow Patriarchate in 1957. Neither of these cases provoked Moscow to sever ties with Constantinople more than temporarily—but Ukraine may be felt to be too important to lose.16 

Rocky road ahead 

Unfortunately, one thing is for sure: There is now a great risk of provocations and even violence. Ominous warnings came as early as October from President Putin’s spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov: “Just as Russia defends the interests of Russians and Russian speakers—and Putin has spoken about this many times—Russia will defend the interests of the Orthodox.”17 What Moscow’s “defense” of Russian speakers may mean has already been seen in Ukraine: use of force on foreign sovereign territory in disregard of international norms. 

The Ukrainian government and the new Orthodox Church in Ukraine have guaranteed that no parish will be forced to leave the Moscow-led Church, which will be able to continue to operate in Ukraine, albeit under a new name that links it to Russia. But how exactly will new parishes form, express, and change their loyalties? What happens to potentially thousands of church buildings? Besides Russia-sympathizers, there is also cause to keep an eye on Ukrainian ultranationalists. Yet, given the complex balance of loyalties within local communities, claims of property seizures are extremely difficult for outsiders to verify. There is also the question of the monasteries. The Moscow Patriarchate has around 500 in Russia and approximately a further 200 in Ukraine.18 Those in Ukraine include three lavras—the largest and most important category of monastery; Russia has only two. Such important symbols as the Kyiv Caves, Pochayiv, and Sviatohirsk lavras—whose oldest buildings belong to the Ukrainian state as historical landmarks— may be scenes of particular confrontation. 

What is to be done? 

The religious landscape in Ukraine is evolving rapidly, but as long as the rights of Ukrainian citizens are respected, this evolution should remain an internal issue. Rearranging parishes and their possessions needs to be done peacefully and in a dignified manner. No doubt there will be hurt feelings in some places. Provocations—by any actor—must be called out and assessed in a transparent manner. This will be a test for Ukrainian law enforcement. The international community needs to stay alert as it seeks to vet and verify the information and disinformation emanating from Ukraine and across the Orthodox world. At the same time, the international community should also resist the temptation of interpreting Orthodox canon law. There is no need to take sides in the Church dispute itself. In the end, it should be individual Ukrainians who decide, without any pressure, to which Church they prefer to adhere. That is religious freedom.

Notes 

1. [In Russian] “Vypusk programmy ‘Vremia’ v 21:00, 7 ianvaria 2019 goda,” 1 News Channel, 7 January 2019, https://www.1tv.ru/news/issue/2019-01-07/21:00#5. 
2. [In Russian] “Kontsert, posviashchennyi vossoedineniiu Kryma i Sevastopolia s Rossiei,” 18 March 2015, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47878. 
3. “Appeal by His Holiness Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia,” https://www.jordanville.org/news_080816_1.html.
4. For a good recent monograph on Russia’s battle over history, see Serhii Plokhy’s Lost Kingdom: The Quest for Empire and the Making of the Russian Nation, New York: Basic Books, 2017. 
5. [In Russian] “Ekskliuziv: Dialog Varfolomeia - Kirilla po ukrainskomu voprosu,” Orthodoxia Info, 28 September 2018, https://orthodoxia.info/news/эксклюзив-диалог-варфоломеякирилла/. 
6.  “Metropolitan Onufry tells in Moscow how difficult it is to live in Ukraine,” RISU, 4 February 2016, https://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/orthodox/uoc/62391/. 
7. Andrew Higgins, “Evidence Grows of Russian Orthodox Clergy’s Aiding Ukraine Rebels,” New York Times, 6 September 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/world/ europe/evidence-grows-of-russian-orthodoxclergys-aiding-ukraine-rebels.html.
8. [In Russian] “Interv’iu serbskim izdaniiam ‘Politika’ i ‘Vechernie novosti’”, 16 January 2019, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59680.
9. “Ukraine will no longer be drinking Moscow’s poison from Moscow’s cup,” 16 December 2018, http://commonspace.eu/index.php?m=23&news_id=5000.
10. “Over 300 parishes of UOC-MP joined OCU so far,” RISU, 12 February 2019, https://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/confessional/orthodox_relations/74674/.
11. “Patriarch’s message deals with Kosovo, Montenegro, diaspora,” B92, 4 January 2019, https://www.b92.net/eng/news/society.php?yyyy=2019&mm=01&dd=04&nav_id=105914.
12.  “For Patriarch John X of Antioch, it was unreasonable to put an end to the Ukrainian schism at the price of Orthodox world unity,” Orthodoxie.com, 8 January 2019, https://orthodoxie.com/en/forpatriarch-john-x-of-antioch-it-was-unreasonable-to-put-an-endto-the-ukrainian-schism-at-the-price-of-orthodox-world-unity/.
13. [In Russian] “Mitropolit Volokolamskii Ilarion: Ia nadeius’, chto Ierusalimskii Patriarkhat prodolzhit podderzhivat’ kanonicheskuiu UPTs,” Russkaia liniia, 17 January 2019, https://rusk.ru/newsdata.php?idar=83210. 
14. “Head of the Polish Church: Epiphany is not a member of the clergy,” UOJ, 8 January 2019, https://spzh.news/en/news/59024-glava-polyskoj-cerkvi-jepifanijne-svyashhennosluzhitely.
15.  “Patriarch Receives Moscow-Subordinated Reps of Ukrainian Church,” Georgia Today, 21 February 2019, http://georgiatoday.ge/news/14563/Patriarch-Receives-Moscow-SubordinatedReps-of-Ukrainian-Church. 
16. Serge Keleher, “Orthodox Rivalry in the Twentieth Century: Moscow versus Constantinople,” Religion, State and Society, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1997, 126-7, https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/rss/25-2_125.pdf.
17.  [In Russian] “Rossiia zashchitit interesy pravoslavnykh na Ukraine,” 5 TV, 12 October 2018, https://www.5-tv.ru/news/224093/rossia-zasitit-interesy-pravoslavnyh-naukraine/.
18.  [In Russian] “Tserkovnaia statistika,” Deacon Andrei Kuraev’s blog, 7 July 2014, https://diak-kuraev.livejournal.com/666945.html.

Jaakko Lehtovirta holds a PhD in Russian history (1999). He is currently a visiting senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, seconded from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. All views expressed are his own